

The Contrast-Image – Disjunctions between Consciousness and Cinema

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Abstract

This essay operationalizes connections between cinema and philosophy for the field of education by problematizing the potencies of images in their relations with thought and consciousness, simultaneously highlighting the urgency of problematizing cognition and the importance of the creation of the new beyond what is necessarily useful. To begin with, the concept of consciousness, in its relations with images and movement, is problematized, especially vis-à-vis the philosophy of Henri Bergson and the way in which it is taken up by Gilles Deleuze, thereby highlighting its differences with phenomenology. In a second movement, cinema-thought is directly related to the time-image, with emphasis on the relationship between music and visual images. In so doing, the authors point out that, in the game between the movement-image and the time-image, cinema gives to us another image, namely the contrast-image. Following this, the authors hold that encounters with the contrast-image can allow for thought to be moved to think in the interval produced by the contrast-image, in turn fabricating a kind of trance within consciousness that is more connected to the powers of perception and affection, thus escaping the identification and immediate recognition of genres and universal aesthetic models.

Introduction

This text seeks to work on connections between the education field and cinema, by problematizing cognition and the importance of creating the new beyond what is necessarily useful. When we connect with cinema images, especially those in which there is a greater work of experimentation, the effects produced between sound and imagetic assemblages can allow openings to sensations that escape the usual ways of perceiving, feeling and presenting a response. Thus, some audiovisual images inspire thought that does not rely on either recognition or habit to validate the true and open a crack in the filmic whole, which can be occupied by other connections between affects and percepts, coming to innovate and present a response *creatively*. In this movement, closely linked to possible connections between visual and sound-images, thought would go through interruptions, through breaks that disarticulate the usual form of montage and give it a fluid dramaticism between what forms imagetically – in a continuous movement of modulation games – and the new circuits that connect themselves to the senses, intensifying textures and varying its own rhythms, so that a kind of image is created in this composition

that is inseparable from what it comes to present – a contrast-image. We approach the discussions by Fialho (2021) when he argues about the distinction between inert matter and matter capable of having perception, action and affection.

Most of all, we seek to point out how cinema, connecting music to the visual image, establishes this contrast-image (Novaes 2014) pin a composition with the philosophies of difference, especially that of Gilles Deleuze. Such philosophies, when taking the differences and multiplicities out of the game that reduces everything to the pair One and Multiple, or not being worked in a synthesis of the negative to build on ideas and general terms, often quite abstract and distinct from each other, end up problematizing and intensifying perceptions and understandings in between the poles: gender, classification, habit, judgment. The encounter with these types of contrast-images could allow thought to think in the interval, escaping recognition, logic and identification, causing a shock in the way this image is perceived, making it difficult to immediately recognize it to link it to standardized aesthetic genres and models. It seems possible, in the encounter with images, to have an opportunity to feel something different, but we still do not necessarily know to recognize what, because we would be taken by a certain virtuality, an indiscernibility that prevents the formulation of a judgment that validates a truth (Novaes & Amorim 2021).

The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze creates concepts in philosophy privileging encounters and intercessors. Among them is Henri Bergson (1850–1941), who strengthens, in Deleuzian philosophy, the importance given to extensive and intensive differentiations for the constitution of the living being in its encounters with states of affairs. Deleuze will replace the Bergsonian concept of *élan vital* with the concept of continuous complex differentiation to show how the living being creatively composes its path between the actual and the virtual. Such continuous complex differentiation also affirms Deleuzian philosophy as an immanent philosophy, escaping a possible dualism that would be present in the conceptualization of the *élan vital*. At the same time, that it would not reduce the perceptions of the living being (especially human perception) to ordinary perceptions, which could standardize their ways of understanding, comprehending and attributing judgments about themselves and about the world. Bergson's spatio-temporal problematizations about the living, which accompanied the change in scientific thinking of his time (mainly because of Einsteinian relativism, which will point out that relations with a phenomenon will vary according to time and space), will actualize in the human sciences a philosophy that will problematize the static relation between subject and object and, therefore, the very concept of consciousness, a strong word in education, closely linked to the idea of defining singular, individual values and judgments, but simultaneously related to general ideas and common points of view which disallow us to feel differently.

If the actual and the virtual are, for Deleuze, important concepts for a philosophy of immanence, which comes to complexly intensify the relations of the living being in its

encounters with milieus and the states of things, Bergsonian thought in relation to movement-images, further developed by Deleuze – especially in his classes and books about cinema, but also his initial book on Bergson – helps us both to think about another relation with time and space, as well as to think about our own relation with images and the processes of differentiation through which multiplicities pass, both quantitatively (related to matter, to the object) and qualitatively (related to duration, to the subjective). That is, Deleuze proposes that differences do not emerge as denials or degradations of an order or a being previously given, but instead composes a plane of reality in which, extensively or intensively, they would creatively contrast and differ from each other to provide conditions for perceptions and creations of life. Such perceptions are affirmed not only in the friction between actions and sensorimotor reactions, but also by the force of affection for a possible actualization of a new action which, for us, would open a crack to thought. For education, this would mean that knowledges and experiences are felt intensely and not merely in generic and repetitive applications of forms and theories that can be recognized from a project of unity or equality, sometimes far from the singular connections of each living being with the variations of their own milieu.

The movement-image and the light-image – implications for consciousness

In his courses on cinema, held between the end of 1981 and the middle of 1985, Deleuze dedicated himself to thinking about the relations between images and thought; that is, between cinema and thought. In a first stage, which comprises the period from November 1981 to June 1982, the philosopher is dedicated to extracting connections from Bergson's thought, especially from the book *Matter and Memory*, through which he can point out that Bergsonian philosophy goes beyond a problem that emerged in modernity, which implied a way of relating images and movement. This problem consisted mainly of a crisis that would affect classical psychology for which, on the one hand, in our consciousness there would be images (inextensive qualities) and, on the other hand, in the world there would be the movements (extensive and quantitative variations). As Deleuze puts it:

On the one hand, in my consciousness, there were images. What did that mean? Qualified representations and, more profoundly, unextended qualitative states. An image was an unextended qualitative datum of consciousness, it was in consciousness. On the other hand, what was there in the world? In the world, there were movements. And the movements were configurations and external and quantitative variable distributions. (Deleuze 2009: 129-130)

This crisis would become urgent, especially when one begins to think the analysis of movement and cinematographic reproduction in different areas, among them experi-

mental psychology, which will introduce films into their works. In this way, it became increasingly difficult to sustain the idea that consciousness would be in the images – an unextended qualitative state – and that movement would be in the world. According to Deleuze (2009), many problems that would show the unsustainability of this idea would arise. For example, in a certain sense, one could ask: How is it that with movement in space one will make an unextended quantitative image? In another sense, the supposition that through a voluntary act the image would give rise to a movement of our body, would raise many other questions:

It's assumed that you have an image in consciousness, and then you make movement. But how did an image in your consciousness give birth to the movement in space? What relations can there be between two natures as irreducible, as heterogeneous as images defined as qualitative and unextended states and movements defined as extended quantitative states? In the voluntary act, the image gives rise to a movement in the body. (Deleuze 2009: 130)

Such problems show both the impossibility of sustaining the idea that the image would be in consciousness, as well as the converse position that they point to the unsustainability of the idea that a movement can come to excite us and give rise to an image in our consciousness. Deleuze (2009: 131) asks: "How can this happen, if not because your consciousness itself is covered by movements?" Thus, from this crisis, two tendencies would emerge that would respond differently, but in an irreconcilable way, to the problem concerning image and movement and the ways in which they relate to consciousness. On one side would be Bergsonism¹; on the other, phenomenology².

How will phenomenologists respond to this problem? According to Deleuze (2011), phenomenology will seek to show with Sartre — sustaining an idea of intentionality, which is fundamental for Husserl — that consciousness is openness to the world; that is, it is directed towards something outside of it, supported by the famous formula: "all consciousness is consciousness of something" (Deleuze 2011: 131). Deleuze seeks to relate this phenomenological response to the particular problem between image and movement, in which classical psychology prohibited itself to relate. For him, saying that "all consciousness is consciousness of something" also means that every image is an image of movement, but not only that, the answer goes further, because:

all consciousness is intentionality, which means that all consciousness is consciousness of something situated outside of it, points out something in the world. The image is indeed, then, a mode of consciousness and not something in consciousness. It is an attitude of consciousness, it is an intention. And the movement in the world is

¹ Deleuze points out that close to the aspect of Bergsonism, would also be William James in America and the great Alfred Whitehead in England.

² Phenomenology is contemporary and would be in line with Gestalt theory, the theory of form of the structure (Deleuze 2011).

that to which this consciousness points. All consciousness is consciousness of something. (Deleuze 2009: 131)

Bergson pointed out another way to put the problem, which implied another answer. Deleuze (2009) argues that, for this philosopher, the response from phenomenology “all consciousness is consciousness of something” would be an expression that lacks meaning. But why? Deleuze (2011) states that, at one point, phenomenology and Bergsonism would be in agreement, precisely through this Bergsonian formula: “we do not perceive things in our consciousness, but we perceive them there where they are, that is, in the world” (Deleuze 2011: 132). He also points out that, in relation to perception, Bergson does not stop with this theme: “to realize we put ourselves at once in things” (Deleuze 2011: 132). Thus, for both phenomenology and Bergsonism, “there are no images in consciousness, no qualitative states that would be in consciousness and quantitative states that would be in the world” (Deleuze 2011: 132). However, Bergson could not say “all consciousness is consciousness of something”, but rather, “all consciousness is something”; that is, it is precisely the thing I perceive. For Deleuze, this difference goes through the different way in which they pose the problem and, in this case, what is at stake is the reproduction of the movement. For “the question of the reproduction of movement and the question of the perception of movement are but one” (Deleuze 2009: 135). Thus, for phenomenology the model of movement reproduction is directly linked to a pretension to describe the natural perception of movement, but “to what kind of movement reproduction does it refer to?”, Deleuze will ask (2009: 135).

For Deleuze (2009) phenomenologists have never related images and movement to cinema, because they mainly related it to a kind of anchorage between the body of that which perceives – a version of what it would be ‘to be in the-world,’ or what they call ‘being-in-the-world’; and, on the other hand, even if they walk together, ‘the good form’, “which is a notion that will go through all phenomenology and is taken in the Gestalt theory” (Deleuze, 2009: 135). This relation between anchor and good form is directly linked to an idea of a resting bottom, which means that every anchor accompanies or supposes a resting background. This way of posing the problem in phenomenology gives an opening for Deleuze to suggest that, in relation to image and movement, phenomenologists are more related to a particular type of movement: the stroboscopic movement, the stroboscopic image, and not to the cinema-image, to the cinematographic movement, two types of images that are quite distinct³. In other words, for Deleuze (2009: 136), “the novelty of phenomenology, the way in which they raise the issue of the reproduction of movement, and then of perception, takes us back to the first pre-cinematographic mode”, which will reconstitute the movement not from instant images, but from privileged instants; that is, from incarnating forms.

³ It must be observed that for Deleuze the idea that cinema is based on the stroboscopic image is totally false.

Deleuze points out that phenomenology comes to rupture a way in which Antiquity would refer to intelligible forms in themselves, thus transforming intellectual coordinates into existential coordinates. Moreover, the forms that incarnate will no longer be intelligible, but will be immanent to the perceptual field (*Gestalten*), retaining the way to reproduce the “movement with and in function of coordinates and forms though. From that moment on, forcibly, all consciousness is consciousness of something” (Deleuze 2009: 137). Phenomenology would be before cinema and not because they ignore it, but because “their problem, what they want, is a pure description of natural perception” (Deleuze 2009: 137). Bergson, in seeking to answer the call of his new metaphysics, captured “another completely distinct mode in the production of movement” (Deleuze 2009: 139). Following modern science, which placed time as an independent variable, it performs a movement analysis no longer as a function of privileged instants “with forms and coordinates, but as a function of any instant, that is, with equidistant instants” (Deleuze 2009:139), in order to deduce a perception of pure movement, which is not natural perception⁴.

As Alain Beaulieu (2003) points out, Deleuze will emphasize in the book, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, that in seeking to hold intentionality “in the web of the notion of the world”, phenomenology remains “resting in pre-cinematographic conditions”⁵. Beaulieu also points out that Deleuze would have considered Bergson as the one who best managed to detach the world image in favor of “a flow of matter where there is no anchor point nor any assignable center of reference” (Beaulieu 2003: 260). In other words, Deleuze found in Bergson an ally to cinema-thought and will seek, from the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*, to extract and radicalize Bergsonian thought⁶ to establish a new adequacy in which the image is equal to the movement (IMAGE = MOVEMENT), returning the property of mobility to the cuts, “still condemned by Bergson for their immobility character”⁷ (Beaulieu 2003: 260). For Bergson still could not find an ally in cinema for his theory related to matter, duration and memory; however, the philosopher distrusted cinematography to present the relations between movement-images because he considered it an artificial way of representing movement, still closely related to a succession of moments that would not be able to present the movement-image. After all, Bergson could not follow the evolution and discoveries of cinema in his composition with images.

⁴ “Pure description implies a certain method that Husserl formalized when he spoke of the phenomenological method” (Deleuze 2009: 137).

⁵ “Aux prises avec l’intentionnalité dans le filet de la notion de monde, la phénoménologie ‘en reste à des conditions précinématographiques” (Beaulieu: IM 84).

⁶ Having seen the evolution of cinema and the possibility of perceiving cinematic images beyond the instrument that projected them (the cinematographer), which sounded artificial to Bergson, Deleuze believes that on the screen of cinema we can have the pure perception of movement, without the need for terms as reference images that vary according to a vertical axis, but images that reach the plane of immanence, come together in a universal splash, with the vibration of the universal.

⁷ “C’est donc au nom de cette nouvelle adéquation établie par Deleuze: ‘IMAGE=MOUVEMENT’ (IM 86) que la propriété de mobilité est rendue aux coupes pourtant condamnées par Bergson pour leur caractère d’immobilité”.

As Bogue (2003) argues, “the mechanism of cinema adequately illustrates the movement distortions inherent in consciousness, but Bergson’s apparent doubts about cinema itself are mistaken”⁸. Bergson renounced the possibility of cinema presenting itself as an art that expressed a world of movement-images, believing that the mechanism that would produce the images was too artificial, revealing a still mechanistic world, as it would only reproduce a succession of images of movement, and would not show its connections with duration and the whole. However, perception in relation to images does not sound like a succession of privileged instants, of forms incarnating one another, “but like a direct and immediately moving image (...) a movement-image” (Bogue 2003: 21).

Bogue (2003) adds that the Bergsonian theory, taken up by Deleuze, would not only be the one that best understood this image-movement relation, but also was able to connect “this differentiation between immobile cuts (abstract time) and real movement (concrete duration)” directly to the images presented on the movie screen⁹. Bergson’s proposition would then indicate that there is no duality between image and movement, as if the image were in consciousness and the movement in things, because there is still neither consciousness nor thing. Until now, there is only movement-image, because image is intimately connected to what appears, and what appears is in movement. If what appears is in movement, there is nothing more than a movement-image. And these would act and react on all their faces and on all their parts, until a center of indeterminacy appears. Until then, Deleuze (2009) explains that for Bergson there would be an in-itself of the image, an image would have no reason to be perceived. “There are images that are perceived and others not. A movement may well not be seen by someone and be a movement-image”¹⁰, “(...) There is nothing more than movement, that is, there are only images. So, literally, there is no thing, no consciousness”¹¹ (Deleuze 2009: 148).

For Bergson, consciousness, the brain and the body would be movement-images without any privilege: thing privilege or consciousness privilege. Deleuze points out: “everything is a movement-image and is distinguished by the types of movement and the laws that regulate the relation of actions and reactions in such a universe”¹².

He therefore defines an identity for image = movement and says that Bergson still adds an important point by stating that not only image = movement, but image = movement = matter. He will then place this triple identity. He explains that the first identity of

⁸ The mechanism of cinema aptly illustrates consciousness’ inherent distortions of movement, but Bergson’s apparent misgivings about the cinema itself are misplaced... (Bogue 2003: 21).

⁹ In fact, Deleuze argues, it is Bergson himself who best understands such movement-images, and this differentiation of immobile cuts/abstract time and real movement/concrete durée provides an important first step toward the development of a general theory of cinema. (Bogue 2003: 21).

¹⁰ Which would take us away from Berkeley’s proposition that ‘being is being perceived’.

¹¹ Bergson and the images. Deleuze (2009: 148) adds that phenomenology has conserved the categories of thing and consciousness transforming the relation.

¹² Example given by Bergson in relation to the molecule. The molecule would be an image, because it is strictly identical to its movement. Molecules do not have the same movement in the solid, gaseous, or liquid state. They vary according to laws (relation of an action and a reaction), but remember that the laws for the liquid state are not the same for the gaseous or solid.

matter derives from the movement-image. Because image equals movement, and matter equals image = movement. And this conciliation would go well, because image and matter would be what has no virtuality. Bergson will say that in matter there is nothing hidden. Of course, there are things we do not see and more and more there are more complex instruments that show us this. As Deleuze emphasizes (2009: 150):

But there is one thing that I know as a priori, as independent of experience, according to Bergson: if there can be much more in matter than what I see, there is nothing other than what I see. In this sense it has no virtuality. So in matter there cannot be more than movement. (...) there are images that I do not see, but that does not stop them from being images. (...) the image does not exist at all by reference to consciousness, since consciousness is an image among others.

Thus, before a center of indeterminacy, a privileged perception, or a delay, an image that will not immediately prolong an action suffered in an executed reaction appears, this universe, this plane of immanence could be thought of as a machinic universe of movement-images¹³.

Sauvagnargues (2013) argues that this movement-image realism implies that the image is movement and also matter, always involving a relation of forces, vibrations of movements among matter. Thus, on the plane of movement-images, as Bergson presents in the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* (1999), the images are varying, they collide with each other, acting and reacting with each other, they are not varying according to an image and, even when a centered system emerges, as with the case of the brain in the living being, which can delay a suffered action and present a new reaction or not, this will not eliminate the machinic universe of universal variation, because the brain is an image, as well as the eye. Thus, the images have no reason to vary depending on the particular image.

There is still another aspect related to the perception of the image, which implies another differentiation between phenomenology and Bergsonism, with regard to consciousness. Deleuze (2009: 139) argues that while “phenomenologists have retained the metaphor of the eye” — in which a subject has or carries light, and that light goes from consciousness to things¹⁴ — Bergson would say exactly the opposite: “light is in things. It is the things that belong to the light, it is the things that are light.” Bergson would end up building a world without a subject, a philosophy without a subject, because if it is things that are light, what would be missing for us to be able to perceive them? The darkness, the black screen. That is, according to Deleuze (2009: 139), there would be the following

¹³ Deleuze (2009) puts that it is not a mechanical, mechanistic universe, because it is not a closed set. He recalls that for Bergson the Whole is open. Also because it does not proceed by immovable cuts of movement, but by movable cuts. And finally the universe of moving images goes far beyond contact actions, goes to distances as large as one wants.

¹⁴ La conciencia será luz que, de otra manera, se posaría sobre algo. Ven ustedes, es la idea de la conciencia-luz, las cosas en la oscuridad y el haz de conciencia. (...).

formula in Bergson: “If there is a photo, the photo is taken in things”. In our case, we are the darkness necessary to perceive things, we are not the ones who illuminate them. The light-image is the other face of the movement-image, which may or may not be related to the lived experience, may or may not be perceived. By relating light as the other face of the movement-image, Bergson would be able to sustain the relation, the triple identity: image = movement = matter, and which Deleuze will be able to actualize in cinema-thought, also managing to show how Bergson creates a philosophy that rises to the challenge of the scientific discoveries of the time, especially Einstein’s theory of relativity, in this case, in relation to the invisibility of light and limited relativity — a new type of equation between lines of light, in which there is an inversion of the relation between rigid lines and lines luminous, in which the first is only appearance – constituting a world of light.

Thereupon, in this world crossed by movement-images and light-images, in which “the image in its deepest nature is something that undergoes an action, something that exerts a reaction” (Deleuze 2009: 142), and that its set of actions and reactions composes the machinic universe of movement-images, presenting a world composed of excitations and vibrations, will end up taking away the privilege of the eye in relation to the perception of images, since it is also a movement-image; as well as expanding the possibility that other senses can also perceive other images, as there could be sound-images, tactile-images, which are pluralized in and beyond the presentation of the movement-image by cinema

As Sauvagnargues (2013: 47) exposes:

Cinema is not “an art of the image” in the common sense (of cliché reproduction) but art responds to the movement-image as a physical state. Cinema is especially interesting, but it does not have a privileged position in relation to the image, and it is by no means limited to the visual, as it concerns all sensible appearances. There are also sound-images, or tactile images (opsigns, sonsigns, tatissigns). From one art to another, the nature of images varies and is inseparable from techniques: colors and lines for painting, sounds for music, verbal descriptions for the novel, movement-images for the cinema.

Thus, cinema can present images connected to other arts, such as the sound-image, for example, as well as connecting to painting and fabulating the colorations between lines and colors in the machinic and inventive universe of movement-images. Having worked on the relation between movement-images and consciousness, especially in relation to philosophy, how can cinema think this relation and a supposed past pretension to attempt to anchor it as Art for the Masses and so provoke a shock to a massive awareness of the classes?

History and the movement-image – the sensorimotor schema

It was widely believed at the beginning of cinema that it would make possible a collective thought, which would lead to awareness directed towards a mass desire, such as revolution. For example, the possibility of building images that tried to express and expose a thought in which, in contact with a shock between the images operated by certain logical games of film montage, the oppressed perceived the need to rebel against the injustices of the oppressor, thus imbuing themselves with a fighting spirit to seize power and hand it over to the truly deserving, the people. It was believed that such an image of thought projected on the movie screen would cause the intended effects on anyone who watched it. Now, the possibility of making the people have access to the thought that could enlighten them did not make it possible to take collective consciousness anywhere, or rather, even though it may have accomplished or affected consciousnesses, these did not change in a universal sense. Perhaps Heidegger had already anticipated a distance between having the possibility 'of' and that this possibility produces its expected effects. "Man knows how to think to the extent that he has the possibility of thinking, but this possible still does not guarantee that we are capable of thinking" (2006: 203), Deleuze tells us quoting Heidegger.

Here's what was missing, "the people". However, these people were already in the world, but they did not necessarily represent the figure they wanted to represent as a model. Glauber Rocha showed in *Terra em Transe* ("The Entranced Earth", 1967) that the people are not necessarily the ones who represent them, in this case the people are not even the character Jerônimo (Francisco Milani) – 'poor man', worker and president of the union that aims for the place of speech. When, in the film, the 'people', represented by the Brazilian actor, Flávio Migliacio, tries to take back the voice, to say that the people are not Jerome, the voice of these people is very extreme and very distant from the real speeches, dissonant to the representations and cannot incarnate itself in a discursive figure already thought out, thus, it has to be silenced, killed, in other cases 'improved'. *Terra em Transe* (1967) presents a montage, a game of contrasting images, in which the images collide, vibrate, rub against each other, intersperse pure sensations between the actions and reactions that are actualized or not on the screen. The film's own story or narrative does not seem to prevail, but rather to be subordinated to the compositions between visual and sound-images, a procedure that can be perceived by the dialogues and distances between the speeches and the lives represented by the characters.

In the scene mentioned in this film by Rocha (1967), it is clear that the intention is not to represent reality, based on the camera shaking or exaggerated theatrical gestures exalting allegorical characters. But there is also the incorporation of sound to intensify the scene that follows, in which the character Vieira (José Lewgoy) is carried by the crowd in an atmosphere of celebration and victory, while we listen to music close to a ritual, while a violin offers us a possibility of perception close to a consciousness in tran-

ce, far from the party-type sound that would usually be presented in such a scene. This one is not composed with a theme close to carnival and that could give a more logical and linear representation. The scene composition puts reality in tension contrasting the senses by not progressing in a lyrical way or in a linearity that seeks to represent feelings of identification. The contrasted sound and visual images offer us a shock.

This possible shock in the encounter with the block of sensations composed of the visual and sound will not give us a total perception, nor a collective one, because, contrary to what was believed in modernity, there seems to be no subject outside the image, nor an essence of a universal subject that would come as a light transmitting truths, illuminating the people already thought. Nor would there be an image of the subject that affects everyone, the light that we perceive reflected on the screen presenting us with the images of the film, will not reach the audience in an identical way. Sometimes, the cinema bets more on experience and gaps open to sensations, than on the ascertainment of facts to reach the spectator. Thus, without losing sight of the field of education and its connections with cinema, it is worth asking: why believe in the strength of images to think a journey through/with/in experience that can begin to create friction with habitual knowledge? Simply, because it is believed that thought, when unmolded from its patterns, could trigger a consciousness that is built without knowing its destination in advance, and that blurs the image of a structurally constituted subject, launching it out of its folds. Such a movement would imply the idea of potentializing an education that seeks to affect, in a Deleuzian-Bergsonian sense — and not just constitute judgments and training actions — accepting the drama of life and its a-linear illogicality.

The thinking that tends to link image to the eye, to vision and, consequently, to what can be recognized, related and understood, tends to understand that the forms of perception are invariant from individual to individual, perhaps because it is based mainly on history or on representational figures to think about the human, disregarding the possibility that history is constituted by ruptures that reversed relations established by constituted knowledge, as well as the way in which each individual perceived and reacted to such change. *Terra em Transe* (1967) in its procedure of presenting contrast-images — as in the case of visual images and sound-images that rub and potentiate vibrations for a possible shock in the spectator's way of feeling and understanding — builds a relation between cinema and thought, in which the images are continually and complexly differentiated, not only presenting a certain aberration in their montage games, but also presenting a certain imagetic virtuality that builds and presents on the screen a certain memory for the world, a non-psychological memory, in which, above all, through the connection with music, they give it a direct time-image.

Music and the direct time-image

When speaking of his hypothesis that cinema could present us with a direct time-image, Deleuze refers to an inversion of the subordination of time to movement. In the time-image, time is presented to us without the need to be correlated to the sequence of movements; that is, it does not need to come through a sequence of plans that chronologically expresses a past, present and future. Our own mind does not work like that, we operate by leaps in our memory before we make a decision, before it results in an action. Thinking with Deleuze and Bergson, the leaps we make in our minds do not always place us in a region that gives us a right answer. The very idea of the present would be between a recent past and a future to come. It is time as intensity and not as chronology.

In our cutout of a plane of immanence, we do not stop dislocating, we do not stop intensifying and our mind does not stop bumping with the ephemerality of nature. Nor do we go through the plane of immanence just recognizing things, because it is not marked by an irreversible logic of relations. We use these relations to think and they are not always enough. The living being is not content with just perceiving and recognizing in order to perform an action, a complexity that is amplified as the brain develops. In relation to cinema, Deleuze believes in and names some possibilities of the time-image. We know that the best known and most discussed is the crystal-image, often due to a certain immobility of the camera. There is also a time-image in the disconnection of the sequences of plans that would normally give us the idea of the Whole, of duration. But this Whole given by the montage as a result of the movement-image presents us with a system that is still too linear, even though the past, present and future alternate. The Whole, connected to the time-image, is closer to life, which has no logical sequence, nor does it present the facts linked to each other to give us an explanation.

We generally see the book, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, as related to pre-war cinema and the book, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, to post-war cinema. Or even, the first would be related to extensive time, and the second to intensive time. We know, however, that Deleuze points out that not only does the movement-image consist of extensive movements, the intensive-movements (light) and an unfounded movement of souls (sublime) also belong to the plane. However, such movements shown in pre-war cinema still imply a subordination of time to movement, at the same time they can awaken us to the complexity of the changing Whole as a result of “an absolute of the movement of bodies, an infinity of the movement of light, an unfounded movement of souls: the sublime” (Deleuze 2006: 303-304). What post-war cinema will achieve is the liberation of this subordination of time to movement. There are many characteristics pointed out by Deleuze in this new cinema, one of which is the possibility of changing the action-image in its relation with historical cinema. Another novelty of the new cinema will be the advent of sound and the relations that some filmmakers created with it. We know that before we even had improvised or programmed songs that accompanied the film, while we wat-

ched the images. But the possibility of joining sound and image created other relations in the way we perceive it.

In the beginning, synchrony and the representation of the image through sound were sought, a certain subordination of sound to image. But, as cinema thinking developed, sound had the possibility of acquiring its own potency and being perceived as an image, a sound-image. Herzog (2014) tells us that music creates a texture to the mood and that the camera must accompany it with passion. One must try to touch the soul of the human being, each filmmaker must develop his own technique and touch the soul of the human being, they must have their own life experiences and develop techniques beyond those that are sufficient for journalists. If the sound-image was potentiated, has it not also helped to potentiate the audiovisual scene itself? After all, we can hardly unglue one from the other when we perceive it. Deleuze (2006: 305) tells us about the possibility of the sound-image being a direct time-image having the Nietzschean thought as its intercessor:

the visual image comes from Apollo who sets it in motion according to a measure and makes it represent the whole indirectly and mediately through the intermediary of lyrical poetry or drama. But the whole is also capable of a direct presentation, of an incommensurable “immediate” image for the first, and this time musical, Dionysiac: closer to a bottomless will than to a movement.

When the sound-image starts to gain strength, there is the possibility of cognitive ruptures arising from the usual way in which we received them. Music was one of those. We venture to say that they even helped to compose what would be the so-called genres¹⁵ of films (comedy, adventure, thriller...). But, although music remains tied to a genre, some filmmakers have started to use it in a way that contrasts with the usual. This practice could cause a certain indiscernibility between the usual visual and sound perception. Would there then be a connection with the Deleuzian time-image? Deleuze (2006: 303) uses Hans Eisler to think the question of music:

The fact is that moving images, visual moving images express a whole that changes, but they express it indirectly, in such a way that change as a property of the whole does not regularly coincide with any relative movement of people or things, not even with the inner affective movement to a character or a group: it is expressed directly in the music, but in contrast or in conflict, in disparity with the visual image.

Even if contrast is seen as conflict, and sometimes it is, it is conflict only because we are used to conditioning sound to visual images and because we forget that this form

¹⁵ It seems important to put that the genres would not precede the beginning of cinema and perhaps would not even affect the composition, the plot or script (when there is one). Perhaps what can be more important is the style and the problems that each filmmaker presents.

tends to legitimize an “image consciousness”; I see and recognize, hear and identify. As we have already seen, this consciousness is in a trance and the example of Eisler, mentioned by Deleuze, seems to be a strong indication of how a dissociation between what is taken for granted or true in a falsification of truth can also be dismantled or unmolded by the encounter with these modulatory arts – cinema and music – which carry no consciousness. Cinema modulates light in a movement of continuous variation in which what is presented is always changing, as every image implies change. Music would not cease to be a modulation, but instead of being a modulation of light waves, it would be a modulation of sound waves.

The contrast between sound and visual image seems potent to affirm the production of other forms of learning and coexistence between images without being just by similitude, not imprisoning cognition to a universal recognition or understanding, expanding and being able to intensify other possible perceptions. In *Lessons from the Darkness* (1992), the perception given with the camera that flies over the burning desert seems to acquire incredible potency with the sound of classical music that we hear, sound and auditory perception that are presented to us by the audiovisual image and can affect us by placing us in contact with a consciousness that would make itself felt, we enter time, non-psychological duration, in a Memory-World. The images of this film are potentiated in a disarranged signification or, rather, in significations that do not refer to the same and does not allow us to reproduce the same apprehensions. Herzog presents us with a consciousness-image in contrast, an alien-image that would encounter us between optical and sound disjunctive actualizations, opening a field of virtuality. Each one, filmmaker and/or spectator, will compose a new actualization in immanence, with more intensity if they are open or receptive to the forces of sensations and their pulsating percepts and affects.

Lessons from the Darkness (1992) is composed in acts, and it would seem that Herzog seeks another relation with duration, long takes that can make you feel a sensation of almost infinity and so, as a whole, compose “a memory for humanity”, at the same time that each take can function independently of its relation with the filmic whole, by allowing “the images to reveal their true potency” (Herzog 2014: 192). This film mixes human and inhuman characters (objects, landscapes, music) dislocated from a real relation that easily associates them with historical facts and molded identities. If we can say that Herzog documents the Iraq war, even if the filmmaker tells us that they are images “captured by aliens”, the facts presented obey only the director’s will and seem to escape an absolute truth to which they would be destined in the documentary genre. Each one has the chance to build their truth in the midst of contortionist imagery-sound poetry. *Lessons from the Darkness* (1992) gives birth to non-human perceptions on the screen, fables life between contrasts.

Herzog (2014) believes that a character should never be introduced right at the beginning of a film, and in each act of *Lessons from the Darkness* (1992), we see this proce-

dure being performed not only with the people who appear in the film, but also in the creation of characters which are themselves objects, landscapes and music. On the other hand, still in relation to music, the filmmaker tells us that it does not start when a scene begins, it must be introduced gradually. In act VII of *Lessons from the Darkness* (1992), the music will appear after the beginning of an aerial take and will not be subordinated to the visual image nor will it function as a leitmotiv, which would introduce or reintroduce a character, but, creatively, will give life to itself as a character, as a duration that intensifies and spreads out among the visual images, an image is created that acquires a certain volume, gains textures, in an encounter in which the camera needs to dance and create a choreography. The “image has to access life,” says Herzog (2014), “whatever it creates”, and adds, “we need to reach feelings” that do not come only with understanding. The scene of act VII contrasts intensities of light and movement, rubbing infernal visual images of explosions and fire, with musical duration, composing not only a time-image, but a contrast-image that seeks to access life in its dramaticism and intensify affects and percepts that populate some of this pure time.

The filmmaker still tells us that we have to “go fast and reach the soul of the human being” and for that “we need to have life experiences to understand the human heart” (ibid.). He goes on to point out that, in order to do something like this, one can have intuition, but “there is no technique for intuition”, it is necessary to accumulate “experiences”, cross “the Sahara on foot”, gather many “elements that give us life experiences” (ibid.). Our thought, when provoked to think about other images, also seems to need to walk through desert landscapes. We believe that the scene discussed here opens doors for us and leaves them open so that we can enter and leave/in the scene, to think other possibilities for education with/through/between images. The path through recognition, through the articulation of knowledge, through instituted forms, gives us the world, but what other worlds could we let appear, coexist, create, through poetry, experimentation and variable compositions?

The Herzog scene that we present does not seem to represent the first world, the world founded from representations. Although we recognize or imagine the local fact that is given to us (Iraq) and we can recognize the style of music used (classical), in addition to the aerial take that gives us a kind of perception of the landscape, the junction between them added to the style of the German director seems to detach the image linked to a transmission of information and no longer submit us to an analysis of facts and/or application of techniques. What the image presents can scramble psychological memories and feelings. Its forces sensations thrown at us that can take us to another state and possible changes. The beauty and the sublime are almost disfigured, explosions and smoke gain other potentialities which we are invited to dance to, to deterritorialize our thinking and open ourselves to experimentation, in the contortionist flows of a disarranged perception. In any case, the humanized feelings towards the recognition of what we identify do not help us understand the aesthetics of this image. Perception rules

go through a scramble. The beauty would not find its usual correspondences, and perhaps more differences were made possible to exist. From the world-given, to the 'given-world' thrown at random, open to chance, swirling among other images and sounds. In each bet, a new territory, a new world that can coexist with others. How many resonances and dissonances are presented as possibilities for education?

Open-ended implications for the contrast-image

Quantity of information would not solve the problem of an education interested in thought, affection and creation, even if we believed that the sum of facts could transform it qualitatively. But we bet that more chance of encounters with images with the potency to intensify affections can also rearrange feelings and a sensible actualization releases thoughts that allow new ways of acting. We have seen that Herzog proposes that we reach feelings and we do not believe that they are institutionalized feelings. The director does not seem to agree with institutions, or rather, with the way they work, in his case with the image.

In the case of *Lessons from the Darkness* (1992), we have a contrast-image given by cinema that is thought and created in its sound and visual connection. When this image appears, it appears already connected, it comes together, although its effects are not given. In what sense can the contrast mark a recognitive rupture? Or point out that the way we are used to receiving an unusual form between image-sound junction can dislocate uses of languages that do not refer us to the consciousness 'of'? Because we bet more on a consciousness in trance, to be actualized by the possibility of an encounter in which we can feel differently, actualizing non-universal qualities by fracturing habits and inverting logics that are not paralyzed in the milieu and in space.

It seems pertinent and challenging to also occupy educational territories, institutionalized many times over, and join the fight to open cracks that capacitate other possibilities of existence, of lives, in addition to those programmed in the midst of these. There is always the risk of being caught up in representation, in reproduction, but the risk is part of the drama of life. The risk taken by Herzog, in the scene to which we referred, documents sound textures of smoke, acrobatic takes and the sublime of burning oil smoke, which rises and dances in scales, deterritorializing junctions of image and music, opening space so that we also set in motion our ways of perceiving and feeling with and through the imagetic forces that can reach us. Sometimes in such an intense way that we do not even react to them, we do not find feelings to apply, because they are disarranged by a sound, a vision of a new sign that vibrates in affection. The less would we care to try to recognize, evaluate, or validate facts.

Would an image like this have the power to transform us? We would say no. The image may or may not affect us, and even if it does, a qualitative change can take time to take

effect. Nor do we believe that a new quality is resolved in states of affairs, at the moment in which it is actualized. An event does not end in what is actualized, as it may not be actualized either. But a certain friction in the relation with images, a contrast-image or a shock-image, can give us an interval in which thought sets itself adrift and with it, new ideas emerge, since the idea is also an image.

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