

Combinatorial Logic for Cinematic Sign Analysis

by HÉLIO REBELLO CARDOSO JR*

Abstract

This article analyzes Gilles Deleuze's adaptation of Charles Sanders Peirce's triadic logic for cinematic semiotics. By introducing the category of Zeroness and expanding Peirce's original framework, Deleuze develops a dynamic classification of movement-images in cinema. The study details the logical structure of these categories and their implications for understanding cinematic signs, offering a comprehensive taxonomy illustrated with film examples.

Keywords

Deleuze, Peirce, Sign, Triadic Logic, Cinema.

1. Peirce's Semiosis and the Logical Classification of Signs

According to Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), signs participate in an evolving process he called *semiosis*, which is irreducibly triadic: “By ‘semiosis’ I mean [...] an action or influence involving a sign, its object, and its interpretant—this tri-relative influence not being resolvable into actions between pairs” (CP 1935[1905]: 5.484)¹.

Peirce's definition can be visualized as a branching diagram (EP2 1998[c.1905]: 364)², where the sign forms the central node, linked to its constituents—representamen, object, and interpretant (R-O-I). Arrows indicate the order of semiotic determination (O-R-I), and the enclosing circle symbolizes the ongoing process of semiosis.

* São Paulo State University – UNESP, Brazil. helio.rebello@unesp.br

¹ We follow the usual notation to the eight volumes of Peirce's *Collected Papers* – CP – added of year of publication, plus date of the original Peirce's manuscript or first print edition, volume and paragraph in CP: (CP year of publication [original date]: vol. paragraph).

² We follow the usual notation to *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings* – EP – added of year of publication of the volume, plus date of the original Peirce's manuscript or first print edition, and page: (EPvol year of publication [original date]: page).




Figure 1. Peirce's tree-branching diagram of semiosis

The sensory experience that signs convey “involves three kinds of elements” or phenomena (Phenomenon 2014 [1903]): quality of feelings, things, and law.

Quality of feelings, “by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort of element [quality] which is all that it is positively, in itself, regardless of anything else” (CP 1932[1894]: 1.303). As such, the feeling of redness, for instance, holds a monadic state (“all [...] in itself”) instantaneously experienced in a vague consciousness (“objectified, still less un-subjectified sense”) (CP 1932[1894]: 1.303).

A material *thing* exhibits a dyadic state, as it embodies the phenomenon of effort-resistance. According to Peirce, “When you put your shoulder against a door and try to force it open [you] have a sense of resistance and at the same time a sense of effort. There can be no resistance without effort; there can be no effort without resistance” (CP 1932[1903]: 1.324).

Law is a phenomenon as experientially real as feelings and material things—its reality is not contingent on its actuality. Yet, unlike brute matter, law does not operate through force but through what Peirce calls “intelligent laws” of thought (CP 1935[1903]: 6.101). These laws, imbued with a mental element, enable mediation—a triadic state—between things. Through this mediation, they allow for the anticipation of actions, revealing law’s *mental* element (CP 1935[1903]: 5.93).

The characteristics of the phenomena can be organized according to the modes of being they instantiate, the relations they entertain and the categories which they belong to:

Phenomena	Modes of being	Relations	Categories
quality (of feeling)	feeling	monadic (1)	Firstness
effort-resistance	thing/brute fact	dyadic (2)	Secondness
thought	law/mediation	triadic (3)	Thirdness

Table 1. Peirce's triadic logic of meaning and their elements.

Furthermore, semiosis operates through a triadic relation among the sign’s components—representamen, object, and interpretant—to generate meaning. From this foundational structure, Peirce developed three trichotomies of signs (EP2 1998[1903]: 291), each classifying signs according to distinct relational aspects. The table below summarizes these trichotomies using Peirce’s original terminology (EP2 1998[1903]: 291-292)³.

	First trichotomy	Second trichotomy	Third trichotomy
	Sign in relation to the representamen (“the sign in itself”)	“the relation of the sign to its Object”	Sign in relation to the interpretant (“as its Interpretant represents it”)
First	Qualisign “the sign in itself is a mere quality.”	Icon “the sign’s having some character in itself”	Rheme the sign which, for its Interpretant, “is a sign of possibility.”
Second	Sinsign the sign in itself is “an actual existent”	Index the sign having some character “in some existential relation to that Object”	Dicisign the sign which, for its Interpretant, is “a sign of a fact”
Third	Legisign the sign in itself is “a general law”	Symbol the sign having some character “in its relation to an Interpretant”	Argument the sign which, for its Interpretant, is “a sign of reason”

Table 2. Peirce’s trichotomies

The set of relations that underlies the semiotic trichotomies authorizes, theoretically, twenty-seven (3x3x3) combinations, but only ten are admissible. It means that each position (1, 2, 3) in the semiotic triadic relation corresponding to representamen, object or interpretant are ordered by the category that comes to occupy these three positions, one at a time. In short, representamen, object and interpretant can be occupied by the phenomena of Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. Consequently, the permissible ten classes with respect to the semiotic relation are those determined according to the *adicities* (monadic, dyadic, triadic) of the categories: Firstness can be determined by Firstness,

³ According to Short (2007: 242), Peirce proposed in 1908 ten trichotomies and sixty-six classes of signs, but we adopt the classification from 1903, because «the matter is quite clear in Peirce’s initial three trichotomies. In his later, very sketchy discussion of ten trichotomies, he himself confessed great uncertainty».

Secondness and Thirdness; Secondness by Secondness and Thirdness; and Thirdness only by Thirdness. However, Thirdness cannot be determined by Secondness and Firstness, nor Secondness by Firstness: “The Third [...] is that which brings about the pair by establishing a relationship. [...] It is the whole process by which the first is evolved the second” (CP 1932[1902]: 2.303). It means that the semiotic triadic relationship cannot be reduced to either dyadic or monadic relations:

Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. (CP 1932[1903]: 1.530)

If the representamen of a sign in the semiotic triadic relation comes to be occupied by a quality, the representamen, the object and the interpretant of the signs so organized are all qualities, for “there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no Thirdness of pure Firstness.” Accordingly, there is but one dependent sign of (1): **(111)**. Being the representamen occupied by a thing, the object and the interpretant can be both qualities (**112** – “Firstness of Secondness”); a quality and thing (**212**); and both things (**222**); but “there is no Secondness of Thirdness.” When the representamen is defined by a law, the object and the interpretant can be both qualities (**113** – “Firstness of Thirdness”); a quality and a fact (**123**); a quality and a law (**133**); both things (**223** – “Secondness of Thirdness”); a thing and a law (**233**); and both laws (**333**); but there is “no Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness.” Peirce’s illustration (CP 1958[1908]: 8.376) displays the permissible (ten fulfilled cases) and non-permissible (empty cases) combinations in the semiotic triadic relation:




Figure 2. Ten permissible combinations in the semiotic triadic relation

The admissible combinations (classes of signs) derived from Peirce’s three trichotomies are organized according to the positions—1st, 2nd, and 3rd—occupied by the phenomena of quality, thing, and law within the triadic relation of representamen, object, and interpretant (CP 1932[1903]: 2.254-2.263). Each class is named using Peirce’s composite nomenclature: the representamen provides the sign’s name, while the object and interpretant contribute its descriptive *surnames* (EP2 1998[1903]: 296):

INTERPRETANT	OBJECT	REPRESENTAMEN	NAMES/EXAMPLES
Rheme (1)	Icon (1)	Qualisign (1)	Qualisign “A feeling of red”
Rheme (1)	Icon (1)	Sinsign (2)	Iconic Sinsigns “An Individual Diagram”
Rheme (1)	Index (2)	Sinsign (2)	Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns “A spontaneous cry”
Dicent (2)	Index (2)	Sinsign (2)	Dicent Indexical Sinsigns “A Weather Cock”
Rheme (1)	Icon (1)	Legisign (3)	Iconic Legisigns “A diagram [type]”
Rheme (1)	Index (2)	Legisign (3)	Rhematic Indexical Legisigns “A demonstrative pronoun”
Dicent (2)	Index (2)	Legisign (3)	Dicent Indexical Legisigns “A street cry”
Rheme (1)	Symbol (3)	Legisign (3)	Rhematic Symbols “A common noun”
Dicent (2)	Symbol (3)	Legisign (3)	Dicent Symbols “Ordinary proposition”
Argument (3)	Symbol (3)	Legisign (3)	Arguments “An argument”

Table 3. Peirce’s nomenclature and classification of signs

We now turn to Deleuze’s semiotics to examine how it draws on Peirce’s theory of signs. Special attention will be given to how Deleuze’s classification of cinematic images reconfigures Peirce’s triadic logic.

2. Expanding Peirce's Triadic Logic through Deleuze's Cinematic Image Classification

Gilles Deleuze's (1925-1995) previous (from the 1960s), non-Peircean triadically framed conception of sign anticipates his reception of the Peircean theory of signs in the 1980s, in his books dedicated to the images of the cinema (Rebello Cardoso Jr. 2018).

In general, Deleuze remains faithful to Peirce's phenomenology and categories, although slightly changing the nomenclature of the three phenomena related to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness to, respectively, "affection," "action," and the "mental":

After having distinguished between affection and action, which he calls Firstness and Secondness, Peirce added [...] the 'mental' or Thirdness. The point of thirdness was a term that referred to a second term through the intermediary of another term or terms. This third instance appeared in signification, law or relation. This may seem to be already included in action, but this is not so. (Deleuze 1985: 197)

For Deleuze, cinema images form signs, so Peircean phenomena can be called images (of cinema) according to the word's etymology ("what appears"): "Peirce begins with the image, from the phenomenon or from what appears. The image seems to him to be of three kinds, no more: firstness [affection-image] [...] secondness [action-image] [...] thirdness [mental-image]" (Deleuze, 1989: 30).

Deleuze surprises the readership, especially the Peircean ones, by proposing expanding Peirce's categories: "why does Peirce think that everything ends with thirdness [...] and that there is nothing beyond?" (Deleuze 1989: 33). He answers: "there will be a 'zeroness' before Peirce's firstness" (Deleuze, 1989: 31-32; emphasis added).

What role does Zeroness play?

Deleuze aims to classify cinematic signs *cinematically*, thereby requiring the infusion of movement into Peircean signs. He introduces a fourth category, "Zeroness," integrating Peircean nomenclature with Bergson's notion of movement as sensory-motor perception. As he states in a lecture on cinema, Peirce's triadic logic enables him to both relaunch and surpass Bergson's metaphysics:

Peirce's categories, for example, firstness, secondness, thirdness, it seems to me, will allow us to *relaunch* [Bergson]. And, indeed, this overflows Bergson, it does not contradict him, it is totally a different kind of problem, [and] it will relaunch the three types of images [affection, action, mental] that were extracted from Bergson [...] – not that Bergson himself – but further than Bergson gives us the means of. That's it, so you shall go on. (Deleuze 1981-1982: lecture 13 part 1; emphasis added)⁴

Zeroness enables a semiotic that classifies images *in* movement. For Deleuze, it corre-

⁴ My translation.

sponds to the fourth image-phenomenon (perception) but is not placed on the same level as the other three. Categorially, it precedes and unites Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, from which it unfolds, “The perception-image will therefore be like a degree zero in the deduction which is carried out as a function of the movement-image” (Deleuze 1989: 31). Phenomena of affection, action-, and mental-images are unified in the movement-image, from which the perception-image’s deductive role extracts them (Cardoso Jr, 2024). Within the sensory-motor *interval* of movement-images, “the perception-image [zeroness] received movement on one side, but the affection-image is what occupies the interval (firstness), the action-image is what executes the movement on the other side (secondness), and the relation[mental]-image is what reconstitutes the whole of the movement with all the aspects of the interval (thirdness functioning as closure of the deduction)” (Deleuze 1989: 31).

Deleuze adds to the phenomena of Zeroness (perception), Firstness (affection), Secondness (action), and Thirdness (mental) other phenomena-image linked to transitional movements. Between Firstness and Secondness (1-2) lies the “impulse-image” (c): “between firstness and secondness, there is something which is like the ‘degenerate’ affect, or the ‘embryonic’ action. [...] between the two, we come across a strange pair: Originary Worlds/Elementary Impulses” (Deleuze 1985: 123). Between Secondness and Thirdness (2-3) is the “reflection-image” [degenerate action or embryonic mental], “which goes from action to relation” (Deleuze 1989: 33).

Deleuze’s expansion of Peirce’s system for the movement-image yields six categories: one generative (perception-image [0]), three Peircean (affection-image [1]; action-image [2]; mental-imagen[3], and two transcategories (1-2; 2-3). The table below summarizes the categories (0, 1, 1-2, 2, 2-3, 3), their functions (generative, categories, transcategories), and corresponding image-phenomena.

CATEGORIES (0,1,1-2,2-3,3)	
<u>Category</u>	<u>Phenomenon or image</u>
(0) Generative category	perception
(1) Category	affection
(1-2) Transcategory	impulse
(2) Category	action
(2-3) Transcategory	reflection
(3) Category	mental

Table 4: Deleuze’s categories and corresponding phenomena

If the six category-images together constitute the movement-image, it remains to explain why they are in motion, or how movement operates within them to generate the signs of the movement-image.

According to Deleuze, “Everything, [in the sensory-motor perception], is indistinguishable from its actions and reactions” (Deleuze 1985: 58), and “we go from total, objective perception, which is indistinguishable from the thing to a subjective perception which is distinguished from it by simple elimination or subtraction. It is this uncentred subjective perception that is called perception strictly speaking” (Deleuze 1985: 65). The oscillation between “objective perception” – the actions and reactions of things regardless of any particular image – and “unicentred subjective perception” – actions and reactions focused on one thing – duplicates Zeroness (0). The perception-image, moving between these poles, organizes the other five images along two interrelated extremes: the “universal variation” of objective perception, since “Everything that is to say every image [thing], is indistinguishable from its actions and reactions: this is universal variation [...] there are neither axes, nor centre, nor left, nor right, nor high, nor low” (Deleuze 1985: 58); and the “centre of indetermination” of subjective perception, “only capable of acting – in the sense of organizing an unexpected response – because it perceives and has received the excitation on a privileged facet, eliminating the remainder” (Deleuze 1985: 64).

Consequently, categorial combinations rely on the triadic movement to semiotically produce. Each image-category, in describing perception’s movement, emits signs according to the generation and displacement of images between the universal variation and the centre of indetermination. Thus, Deleuze’s notion of the sign eventually diverges from Peirce’s: “We therefore take the term ‘sign’ in a completely different way from Peirce: it is a particular image that refers to a type of image, whether from the point of view of its bipolar composition, or from the point of view of its genesis” (Deleuze 1989: 32). In short:

- a) A sign is in *genesis* if Zeroness, the generative category, governs the movement between the universal variation and the centre of indetermination for each image type; thus, there is one sign of genesis per category (0, 1, 1-2, 2-3, 3);
- b) A sign is in composition if, in each triad, it reflects the movement from one of Zeroness’s two poles: the first on perceptive diffusion within the universal variation (‘) – genesis – and the second around the perceptive centre of indetermination (’’) – extinction. Hence, there are two signs of composition (one per pole) and one sign of genesis/extinction per category (0, 1, 1-2, 2-3, 3). (Deleuze 1989: 32)

Thus, the generative category (0), the categories (1, 2 and 3) and the transcategories (1-2 and 2-3) become internally triadic. In this sense, all of them, (0), (1), (1-2), (2), (2-3) and (3) are *intracategories*, because of the movement that generates and drags the images in between the objective pole and the subjective pole of the perception-image,

performing the triadic semiotic movement.

The inoculation of movement in the categories enables the following combinatorial possibilities – the intracategorical triads:

INTRACATEGORIAL TRIADS	
0 \subset 0,1,2,3 at poles (') and (")	
categories	intracategorical triads
(0) perception	0(')(')"
(1) affection	1(')(')"
(1-2) impulse	1-2(')(')"
(2) action	2(')(')"
(2-3) reflection	2-3(')(')"
(3) mental	3(')(')"

Table 5. Deleuze’s intracategorical triads

3. The classificatory table of the signs of the cinema: definitions and examples

There is one sign class for each of the six category-images (perception, affection, impulse, action, reflection, mental), each containing three sign types (one of genesis, two of composition). Thus, there are eighteen signs (three per category) plus three additional action signs, as the action-image—the movement-image’s central category—has “large” and “small” forms. Consequently, Deleuze’s table comprises twenty-one types: “We have, which fills me with a very great satisfaction, we have distinguished 21 types of signs, 21, 3x7, since I remind you that we have established 7 columns each of which had at least three signs, so here we are with our 21 signs” (Deleuze, 1982–1983: lecture 34 part 1).

The table below shows how signs of genesis and composition arise from emphasis on the movement’s poles—either the universal variation (') or the centre of indetermina- tion ("). They are listed by the phenomena-image they convey, their category number, and the sign’s name.

TYPES OF SIGNS	INTRACATEGORIAL TRIADS						
	PERCEPTIO N-IMAGE (0)	AFFECTION- IMAGE (1)	IMPULSE-IMAGE (1-2)	ACTION- IMAGE (LARGE FORM) (2)	ACTION- IMAGE (SMALL FORM) (2)	REFLECTION- IMAGE (2-3)	MENTAL (RELATION) -IMAGE (3)
SIGN OF GENESIS	GRAM or ENGRAM 0(0)'(0)"	QUALISIGN Of DESCONEXION 1(1)'(1)"	SYMPTOM 1-2(1-2)'(1-2)"	IMPRESSION 2(2)'(2)"	VECTOR or LINE OF THE UNIVERSE 2(2)'(2)"	DISCURSVE (sign) 2-3(2-3)'(2-3)"	SYMBOL 3(3)'(3)"
SIGN OF COMPOSITION at ' (FIRST POLE)	RHUME or REUME 0(0)'(0)"	ICONS OF OUTLINE 1(1)'(1)"	FETISH of GOOD or RELIC 1-2(1-2)'(1-2)"	SYNSIGN 2(2)'(2)"	INDEX of LACK 2(2)'(2)"	SCULPTURAL or PLASTIC FIGURE 2-3(2-3)'(2-3)"	MARK 3(3)'(3)"
SIGN OF COMPOSITION at "(SECOND POLE)	DICISIGN- FRAME 0(0)'(0)"	ICONS OF FEATURE 1(1)'(1)"	FETISH of EVIL VULT 1-2(1-2)'(1-2)"	DUEL 2(2)'(2)"	INDEX of DISTANCE or of EQUIVOCITY 2(2)'(2)"	THEATRICAL or SCENO-GRAPHIC FIGURE 2-3(2-3)'(2-3)"	DEMARK 3(3)'(3)"

Table 6. Deleuze's twenty-one types of signs: signs of genesis and of composition (at first and second pole) of movement

We now define and encode the twenty-one signs listed above. Definitions draw on Deleuze's cinema books (1985, 1989) and his ninety-two cinema lectures (1981–1985), illustrated with examples from the 741 films he analyzed in *Cinema 1* and *2* (Castromauro 2018).

(0) Perception-image, “[...] the perception gathers together the other categories of phenomena, because it inserts the movement that revolves them from inside: perception is “... the set [ensemble] of elements which act on a centre, and which vary in relation to it” (Deleuze 1985: 217).

Signs of perception:

- a) Sign of genesis of perception – **0(0)'(0)** – gram or engram (Deleuze 1982–1983: lecture 28 part 2) – a sign of the generative category (0) emphasizing its genesis. **0(0)'(0)** indicates that the *engram* is generated as *perception* (0) moves from the universal variation (0)' toward the center of indetermination (0)”; the perception described is in the volatile state of an image in genesis (Deleuze 1985: 217).

Example: “Movement must go beyond itself, but to its material, energetic element... A whole aspect of that cinema is concerned with attaining a pure perception, as it is in things or in matter, to the point to which molecular interactions extend. Brakhage explores a Cézannian world before man, a dawn of ourselves, by filming all the shades of green seen by a baby in the prairie” (Deleuze 1985: 84).




Figure 2. Film stills – gram or engram – from *Anticipation of the Night* (Brakhage 1958)

There is a sign, **0(0)'(0)**, that reverses the genesis movement **0(0)'(0)** by moving toward the universal variation (0) away from the center of indetermination. This constitutes the *sign of extinction*⁵ of perception, inverting the engram.

- b) Sign of composition of perception at ()' (first pole) – **0(0)'(0)** – rhume or reume (Deleuze 1982–1983: lecture 28 part 2) – a sign of category (0), representing a perception (0) observed from the universal variation (0)' toward the center of indetermination (0)”. Beginning at the universal variation, the sign conveys the becoming-liquid of the perception-image, as the subjective perception (the one who sees) overlaps the objective pole (the movement seen), making the image flow (Deleuze 1985: 80). Deleuze re-names Peirce’s rheme as rhume, from the Greek root meaning “that which flows”

⁵ The signs of extinction will be described later for the six movement-images.

(Deleuze 1985: 229).

Example: “And in Epstein’s *Coeur fidèle*, it was the travelling fair, where everything tends towards the simultaneity of the movement of the one who sees and the movement seen, in the dizzy disappearance of fixed points ... a consciousness in act [en acte], which amplified movement and introduced it into matter, with all the delight of discovering the activity of montage and of the camera” (Deleuze 1985: 77).



Figure 3. Film stills – rhume or reume – from *Coeur Fidèle* (Jean Epstein, 1923)

c) Sign of composition at ()” (second pole) – **0(0)’(0)**” – dicisign-frame⁶ – a sign of category (0), meaning that the *dicisign* is a *framed* perception (0) that describes the movement of perception (0) observed from the pole of the center of indetermination (0)”, toward the universal variation (0)’. Starting at the center of indetermination, the *dicisign* conveys the solid state of perception by linking the objective and subjective poles of movement (Deleuze 1985: 217). Deleuze retains Peirce’s term but clarifies that the dicisign frames another perception in motion, so it appears as if static or solid (Deleuze 1982–1983: lecture 28 part 2); for Peirce, dicising is the “proposition in general” (Deleuze 1985: 217).

Example: “Lewin’s *Pandora and the Flying Dutchman* opens with the long shot of a beach where groups are running towards a point; the beach is seen from a distance and from a height, through a telescope on the promontory of a house. But very quickly we learn that the house is inhabited, and the telescope used, by people who are very much part of the set under consideration: the beach, the point which attracts the groups, the event taking place there, the people mixed up in it” (Deleuze 1885: 72).

⁶ The signs of composition – one for each pole of movement – can furthermore be considered together as one bipolar sign. The bipolar signs will be described later.




Figure 4. Film stills – dicisign-frame – from *Pandora and the Flying Dutchman* (Albert Lwein, 1951)

(1) Affection-image, “[...] that which occupies the gap between an action and a reaction” (Deleuze 1985: 217).

Signs of affection:

- a) Sign of genesis of affection – **1(1)’(1)** – qualisign of disconnection – a sign of category (1) emphasizing its genesis (1(1)). The *qualisign* arises as *affection* (1) moves from the universal variation (0)’ toward the centre of indetermination (0)” of the perceptive bow. For Peirce, a qualisign designates “a quality which is a sign” (Deleuze 1985: 217); for Deleuze, the *qualisign of disconnection* is an unactualized quality appearing in “any-space-whatever” as a *disconnected* affect, “independently of the states of things or milieu which actualise them...or neither the one nor the other – it hardly matters” (Deleuze 1985: 120). Here, the affection-image exists in an amorphous space of possibilities: “independently of the connections and orientations which the vanished characters and situations gave to them...There are therefore two states of the any-space-whatever, or two kinds of ‘qualisigns’, qualisigns of disconnection and of emptiness”⁷ (Deleuze 1985: 110).

Example: “Some of Jorge Iven’s films give us an idea of what a qualisign is. ‘Rain is not a determined, concrete rain which has fallen somewhere. These visual impressions are not unified by spatial or temporal representations. What is perceived here with the most delicate sensibility, is not what rain really is, but the way in which it appears when, silent and continuous, it drips from leaf to leaf, when the mirror of the pool has goose-pimples, when the solitary drop hesitatingly seeks its pathway on the window-pane, when the life of a city is reflected on the wet asphalt’” (Balázs in Deleuze 1985: 110).

⁷ The qualisign of emptiness is the sign of extinction of affection and will be defined later.



Figure 5. Film stills – qualisign of deconnection – from *Rain* (Joris and Franken 1929)

b) Sign of composition of affection at ()' (first pole) – **1(1)'(1)**" – icon of outline – sign of category (1), the icon signifies an affection (1) describing perception's movement (0) seen from the universal variation pole (0)', tending to the indeterminate center (0)". Deleuze retains Peirce's term but shifts its sense: the *icon* expresses changing facial qualities (Deleuze 1982-1983: lecture 27 part 3). For Peirce, it is "the sign's having some character in itself". Since the icon relates to facial affection, it *outlines* perception's qualities from the universal variation. It traces the cosmic contour of the face: "the face as an outline, by an encircling line which traces the nose, the mouth, the edge of the eyelids, and even the beard and the cap: it is a surface of faceification [visag  ification]" (Deleuze 1985: 88).

Example: "There are famous Griffith close-ups in which everything is organised for the pure and soft outline of a feminine face (notably the iris procedure): a young woman thinks about her husband in *Enoch Arden* ... we are before a reflexive or reflecting face as long as the features remain grouped under the domination of a thought which is fixed or terrible, but immutable and without becoming, in a way eternal ... We can only know that Griffith's young woman is thinking about her husband because we see the image of the husband immediately afterwards: we had to wait and the link seems to be merely associative" (Deleuze 1985: 89-90).



Figure 6. Film stills – icon of outline – from *Enoch Arden* (Griffith 1911)

c) Sign of composition of affection at ()” (second pole) – **1(1)’(1)”** – icon of feature – sign of category (1), the icon signifies an affection (1) describing perception’s movement (0) from the center of determination (0)”, tending toward universal variation (0)’. Starting at the center of determination (Deleuze, 1982-1983: lecture 23 part 3), the *icon of feature* traces facial qualities. It shows traits as scattered perceptual marks, blurring the outline icon via new, often conflicting affections, revealing a broader perception behind the outlined face (Deleuze 1985: 88).

Example: “in Eisenstein’s *The General Line*, the handsome face of the priest is dissolved, giving way to a cheating look which links up with the narrow back of the head and the fleshy earlobe: it is as if the traits of faceity were escaping the outline, and testifying to the priest’s resentment ... To produce a new quality, to carry out a qualitative leap, this is what Eisenstein claims for the close-up: from the priest-man of God to the priest-exploiter of peasants” (Deleuze 1985: 89-90).



Figure 7. Film stills – icon of feature – from *The General Line or Old and New* (Eisenstein & Aleksandrov 1929)

(1-2) Impulse-image: the “passage to the action-image” (Deleuze 1982-1983: lecture 34 part 1). The gap between affections and actions is filled by impulses tied to behavior (Deleuze, 1985: 124). These transitions follow two modes—impulses (passions, feelings, emotions) *affecting* action can be involuntary or perverted, depending on the situation or milieu (Deleuze 1985: 128).

Signs of impulse:

a) Sign of genesis of impulse – **1-2(1-2)’(1-2)”** – symptom – sign of transcategorization (1-2), emphasizing genesis (1-2(1-2)”)”: the *symptom* is a sign generated (Deleuze 1982-1983: lecture 29 part 2) when impulse’s automatic movement (1-2) begins at universal variation (0)’ and tends toward the center of indeterminacy (0)” of the perceptive bow. Due to unawareness, impulse-signs are symptomatic, conveying inner, original world qualities that form a clustered, derived world within ordinary action (Deleuze 1985: 218, 125).

Example: “the invention of originary worlds can appear in localised forms which are very varied, artificial or natural. [...] In Buñuel there is [...] the drawing room [...] [which] is also the primordial location of *The Exterminating Angel*. This was originally embodied in the mysteriously closed bourgeois drawing-room; then, when the drawing-room had scarcely been re-opened, it was re-established in the cathedral, where the survivors are once again united” (Deleuze 1985: 126).



Figure 8. Film stills – symptom – from *The Exterminating Angel* (Buñuel 1962)

b) Sign of composition of impulse at ()' (first pole) – **1-2(1-2)'(1-2)**” – fetish of good or relic – sign of category (1-2): the fetish or good or relic (Deleuze, 1985: 125) is an impulse-sign describing perception’s movement (0) from universal variation pole (0)' toward center of indetermination (0)”. The fetish is a fragment—character or feeling—where an original inner impulse concentrates to express straightforwardly its often-ambivalent general affection in derived action (Deleuze 1985: 130).

Example: “Buñuel also adds this: it is not only the poor and rich who participate in the same work of degradation, but so do good and holy men. For they also breed on scraps and remain stuck to the fragments which they carry away [...] A diabolical voice can tell the holy man Nazarin, whose good works constantly hasten the degradation of the world: ‘you are as useless as me’, you are nothing but a parasite” (Deleuze 1985: 130).



Figure 9. Film stills – fetish of good or relic – from *Nazarin* (Buñuel 1959)

c) Sign of composition of impulse at ()” (second pole) – **1-2(1-2)’(1-2)”** – fetish of evil or vult or voodoo objects – sign of category (1-2): this fetish (Deleuze, 1982-1983: lecture 29 part 2) is an impulse-sign (1-2) describing perception’s movement (0) from indetermination center (0)” toward universal variation (0)’. It is a partial object—fragment—where an original inner impulse acts *obliquely or perversely*, as incantation or demonic possession, concentrating affections in action. This is the voodoo sign, the “choses envoûtantes” (Deleuze 1985: 130), from witchcraft vocabulary: “The object of the impulse is always the ‘partial object’, or the fetish; a haunch of meat, a raw morsel, a scrap, a woman’s briefs, a shoe” (Deleuze 1985: 128).

Example: “Fetishes even appear in the disturbing form of ‘vults’, with [...] the belladonna of [Losey’s] *The Go-Between*” (Deleuze 1985: 137).



Figure 10. Film stills – fetish of evil or vult or voodoo objects – from *The Go-Between* (Losey 1971)

(2) Action-image. Signs of action: “It[action] surges in the centre of indetermination, that is to say in the subject, between a perception which is troubling in certain respects and a hesitant action.”, it is a “[...] reaction of the centre to the set [ensemble]” (Deleuze 1985: 65; 217).

a) Signs of genesis of action – **2(2)'(2)**’:

a.1 Large form – 2(2)'(2)’ – impression – sign of category (2), with emphasis on genesis $2(2)$ ’’: the impression is a generated sign when *action* (2) moves from universal variation (0)’ toward the center of (0)’’ in the perceptive sweep, as a situation triggers action—the first or large form (Deleuze 1982-1983: lecture 33 part 1): “An impression [...] will ensure the link of the impregnating situation to the explosive action, this genetic sign that overlaps the way I handle any object, discloses in me an emotion, an emotional content” (Deleuze 1982-1983: lecture 30 part 2).

Example: “In a situation in *On the Waterfront*, where the woman behaves ambivalently, and where the man feels timid and guilty, he picks up the glove that she has dropped, keeps it and plays with it, finally slipping it on to his hand. It is like a genetic or embryonic sign for the action-image, that could be called *impression* (emotional object) and which already functions as a ‘symbol’ in the sphere of behaviour” (Deleuze 1985: 159).



Figure 11. Film stills – impression – from *On the Waterfront* (Kazan 1954)

a.2 Small form – 2(2)'(2)’ – vector or line of the universe – sign of category (2), with emphasis on genesis $2(2)$ ’’: the vector is a generated sign when action (2) moves from universal variation (0)’ toward center of indetermination (0)’’ in the perceptive sweep, as action discloses the situation —second or small form (Deleuze, 1985: 160). It is the genetic sign of “behaviour” when the center of indetermination provides an action pro-

ducing a yet-unclear situation, forming a vectorial space: “Vector (or line of the universe): broken line which brings together [following the line of universe] singular points or remarkable moments at the peak of their intensity. Vectorial space is distinguished from encompassing space” (Deleuze 1985: 218).

Example: “[...] in Mizoguchi: the sequence-shot ensures a sort of parallelism of vectors with different orientations and thus constitutes a connexion of heterogeneous fragments of space, [...] thus in *Ugetsu Monogatari* we see the hero bathing with a fairy, then the overflow which forms a stream in the fields, then the fields and a plain, and finally a garden where we again find the couple, having dinner, ‘several months later’ [this is] the potter’s line of the universe” (Deleuze 1985: 193-194).



Figure 12. Film stills – vector or line of the universe – from *Ugetsu Monogatari* (Mizoguchi 1953)

b) Signs of composition of action – **2(2)'(2)''**:

b.1 Large form at ()' (first pole) – **2(2)'(2)''** – synsign – sign of category (2): 2(2)' meaning the *synsign* is the sign of an action (2) describing perception's movement (0) from universal variation pole (0)' toward center of indetermination (0)", when a situation generates action (first or large form). Deleuze alters both the definition and the spelling of Peirce's *sinsign*, changing *sin* to *syn* to stress that this sign expresses qualities actualized *together with* – *syn* – a thing, not as singularities – *sin* – as in Peirce (Deleuze 1985: 236).

Example: “*Nanook of the North* begins with the exposition of the milieu [given situation], when the Eskimo approaches with his family. An immense synsign of the opaque sky and the ice [things] slopes where Nanook wins his struggle for survival in a hostile milieu: the duel with the ice to build the igloo and above all, the famous duel with the seal” (Deleuze 1985: 143-144).



Figure 13. Film stills – synsign – from *Nanook of the North* (Flaherty 1922)

b.2. Large form at ()” (second pole) – **2(2)’(2)”** – duel – sign of category (2); 2(2)” indicates that the duel is a sing of an action (2) describing the movement of perception (0), seen from the center of indetermination (0)”, tending toward universal variation (0)’, when a given situation requires an action (first or large form). The duel emerges when the situation coincides with the center of indetermination, which actualizes an action — the duel of an agent with the situation (Deleuze 1985:152).

Example: “Take for example Sjöström's *The Wind* (his first American film). The wind never stops blowing across the plain [...] But there is also a whole state of things which actualises this power, combines it with that of the prairie, in a determinate space, Arizona: a realist milieu. A girl from the South arrives in this country, which she is not used to, and finds herself caught in a series of duels [...] Having killed the dealer [who tried to rape her] she tries desperately to bury him in the sand, but the wind uncovers the corpse each time. This is the moment at which the milieu throws down the strongest challenge to her, and where she reaches the essence [fond] of the duel. Reconciliation then begins: with the cowboy who understands and helps her, with the wind, whose power she comprehends as she feels a new mode of being growing within her” (Deleuze 1985: 142-143).




Figure 14. Film stills – duel - from *The wind* (Sjöström 1928)

b.3. Small form at ()' (first pole) – $2_{(2)'}(2)''$ – index of lack – sign of category (2); $2_{(2)'}$ means the index of lack signifies an action (2) describing the movement of perception (0) from the pole of universal variation (0)', tending toward the center of indetermination (0)", when an action reveals the situation (second or small form). For Peirce, the index is "a sign, which refers to its object by a material link"; for Deleuze, it marks an action performed when the situation is not given (Deleuze 1985:160). As the index relates to universal variation, the situation framing the action *lacks*. The *index of lack* is the sign emitted when a gap interrupts the action, announcing or introducing a new situation (Deleuze 1985:160).

Example: "For example, in *Public Opinion* [*Woman of Paris*], Chaplin insisted on the gap of a year, which was not filled by anything, but which we can infer from the new behaviour and clothes of the heroine, who has become a rich man's mistress. Similarly, the faces did not merely have an autonomous expressive or affective value, but neither did they simply indicate what was going on off screen: they really did function as indices of a global situation. Thus, the famous image of the train, whose arrival we only see from the lights which pass across the woman's face, or the erotic images which we can only infer from the spectators" (Deleuze 1985: 160-161).



Figure 15. Film stills – index of lack – from *A Woman of Paris* (Charles Chaplin 1923)

b.4. Small form at ()” (second pole) – $2_{(2)}(2)$ ” – index of distance or equivocity – sign of category (2); $2_{(2)}$ ” indicates that this index is the sign of an action (2) describing the movement of perception (0) from the center of indetermination (0)”, tending toward universal variation (0)’, when an action discloses the situation (second or small form). Since the index relates to the center of indetermination and the situation is delayed, the action appears either equivocal or too distant for immediate agency. The *index of equivocity* signals a forthcoming action arising from “infinitely small differences” in the situation (Deleuze 1982–1983: lecture 31, part 2). These small differences shape the emerging situation while rendering the action itself ambiguous (Deleuze 1985: 161–162). Example: “In *Public Opinion* [*A Woman of Paris*], [...] she [the heroine] has a more equivocal relationship with her rich lover, which leads the spectator to wonder constantly whether she is attached to him by fortune, luxury, and a certain complicity, or whether she loves him with a much more profound and all-embracing love” (Deleuze 1985: 161).



Figure 16. Film stills – index of distance or of equivocity – from *A Woman of Paris* (Chaplin 1923)

(2–3) Reflection-image: “Just as the pulsion image was a transition from affection to [...] action, so are figures now for us a transition from action to [...] what? we already know [...] the mental image” (Deleuze 1982–1983: lecture 33, part 2). The mental image *reflects*, as a form of Thirdness intervenes in the image to perform a *reflected* action (Deleuze 1985: 182), an action-image following the transformation from large to small form and vice-versa. Thus, reflection emits signs of “[...] deformations, transformations or transmutations [of the large form into the small one, and vice-versa]” (Deleuze 1985: 178).

Signs of reflection:

- a) Sign of genesis of reflection – **2-3(2-3)'(2-3)''** – discursive (sign) – sign of the trans-category (2-3), emphasizing its genesis. (0(0)') indicates that this sign arises when the movement of *reflection* (2–3) begins from universal variation (0)' and tends toward the center of indetermination (0)'' of the perceptive sweep. The *discursive sign* employs the mental image to *reflect* the transformation from large to small form of action, and thus “tends to go beyond itself towards a higher instance, as a ‘thirdness’ capable of converting the images and their elements” (Deleuze 1985: 182). Reflective action operates through figures or “actions of discourse [...] [metaphor, metonymy; synecdoche; allegory; literal sense]” (Deleuze 1989: 33).

Example: “Chaplin uses [introduces] the Figure of discourse into the cinema, thus transforming the initial problems of the action-image. Hence the particular importance of *The Great Dictator*, where the final discourse [...] is identified with all human language, represents everything that man can say, in comparison with the false language of nonsense and terror, sound and fury that Chaplin has the genius to invent and put into the mouth of the tyrant. The small burlesque form lacked nothing; but, in his last films,

Chaplin pushes it to a limit which links it up again with a large form which no longer needs the burlesque, but which retains its power and its signs. Indeed, it is always the slightest difference which appears in two incommensurable or opposing situations”.



Figure 17. Film stills – discursive (sign) – from *The Great Dictator* (Chaplin 1940)

- b) Sign of composition of reflection at ()' (first pole) – **2-3(2-3)'(2-3)**” – theatrical/scenographic figure – sign of category (2-3), indicating that this figure is the sign of a reflection (2-3) that describes the movement of perception (0) seen from the pole of universal variation (0)' towards the center of indetermination (0)”. The figure reflects the object when action shifts from large to small form (Deleuze 1985: 182). As the large form isn't given, the object appears sculptural, *theatrically* anticipating or replacing the coming action (Deleuze 1985: 181; Deleuze 1982-1983: lecture 33, pt. 2). Example: “Twice, in Part Two of *Ivan the Terrible*, the situation is taken over by a theatrical representation which replaces the action or prefigures the action to come: on one occasion, it is the boyars sanctifying their companions who have been beheaded; on another it is Ivan who provides his next victim with an infernal performance by clowns and circus” (Deleuze 1985: 181).




Figure 18. Film stills – theatrical or scenographic figure – from *Ivan the Terrible* (Eisenstein 1944)

c) Sign of composition of reflection at ()” (second pole) – **2-3(2-3)’(2-3)”** – sculptural/plastic figure – sign of category (2-3), meaning this figure is the sign of reflection (2-3) describing the movement of perception (0), seen from the pole of the center of indetermination (0)” towards universal variation (0)’. It reflects an object when action shifts from small to large form (Deleuze 1985: 182). As the small form isn’t given, action appears as a sculptural object extending the current action, distancing agents from the present situation until a new one emerges (Deleuze 1985: 181).

Example: “Conversely, an action can be extended in plastic and sculptural representations, which distance us from the present situation: the obvious example is the stone lions in *Battleship Potemkin*” (Deleuze 1985: 181).




Figure 19. Film stills- sculptural or plastic figure – from *Battleship Potemkin* (Eisenstein 1925)

(3) Mental-image: the mental is for Deleuze related to relation and thought in the sense that Peirce ascribes to thirdness:

And the relation is a fascinating thing [...] What is this thing that comes between two things, unites them, cannot be reduced to either one or the other and can disappear just like it appeared? Peter and Paul are alike [...] I turn my head and they are no longer alike, can you realize that? [...] the mental image, it's going to be that. It is no longer about affection, OF perception, of action, it is about relation. (Deleuze 1982-1983: lecture 33 part 2)

Signs of the mental:

- a) Sign of genesis of the mental – **3(3)'(3)"** – symbol – sign of category (3), with emphasis on its genesis (3(3)"): the *symbol* arises as mental movement (3) goes from universal variation (0)' to the center of indetermination (0)" in the perceptual sweep. For Deleuze, the *symbol* refers to abstract/logical triadic relations not actualized as natural or dyadic ones; it appears in, but is not reducible to, the object supporting them (Deleuze 1982–1983: lecture 33, pt. 3). This function revises Peirce's definition: Deleuze sees symbol as relations independent of their terms, whereas Peirce links it to natural laws tied to the related objects (Deleuze 1985: 218).

Example: "[...] what we will call a symbol is not an abstraction, but a concrete object which is a bearer of various relations, or of variations of a single relation, of character with others and with himself ... In *the Birds*, the first gull which strikes the heroine is a demark [sign of composition of the mental at second pole], since it violently leaves the customary series which unites it to its species, to man and to Nature. But the thousands of birds, all species brought together, grasped in their preparations, in their attacks, in their moments of rest, are a symbol: these are not abstractions or metaphors, they are real birds, literally, but which present the inverted image of men's relationships with Nature, and the naturalised image of men's relationships between themselves" (Deleuze 1985: 204).



Figure 20. Film stills – symbol – from *The Birds* (Hitchcock 1963)

- b) Sign of composition of the mental at ()' (first pole) – **3(3)'(3)**" – mark – sign of category (3): a mental relation (3) describing the movement of perception (0) from universal variation (0)' to center of indetermination (0)". The *mark* includes the object in a habitual series linked to natural relations (Deleuze 1982–1983: lecture 33, pt. 3; Deleuze 1985: 203).

Example: "It is therefore very important that the terms should be completely ordinary, in order that one of them, first of all can detach itself from the series: as Hitchcock says, *The Birds* must be ordinary birds" (Deleuze 1985: 203).



Figure 21. Film stills – mark – from *The Birds* (Hitchcock 1963)

- c) Sign of composition of the mental at ()" (second pole) – **3(3)'(3)**" – demark – sign of

category (3): a mental relation (3) describing the movement of perception (0) from center of indetermination (0) to universal variation (0)'. The *demark* arises when a term detaches from the habitual series of natural relations typical of the mark (Deleuze 1982–1983: lecture 33, pt. 3; Deleuze 1985: 203).

Example: “In *the Birds*, the first gull which strikes the heroine is a demark, since it violently leaves the customary series which unites it to its species, to man and to Nature” (Deleuze 1985: 204).



Figure 22. Film stills – demark – from *The Birds* (Hitchcock 1963)

The previous 21-sign table contains more: each sign of genesis has a corresponding sign of extinction, as the same movement that gives rise to an image also causes its fading. If semiosis moves from universal variation to the center of indetermination, it may also regress, dissolving the sign: “Sometimes I realize that the sign of extinction necessarily coincides with the sign of genesis. Sometimes, to my astonishment, the sign of extinction will not be the same [...] the sign of genesis will be divided in two” (Deleuze 1982–1983: lecture 27, pt. 3). The two composition signs may also fuse into a bipolar sign, capturing the full perceptual movement between poles: “A bipolar sign [...] Indeed, the sign of composition divides into three whether the two poles are considered simultaneously or one rather than the other. I would have in this case three signs of composition” (Deleuze 1982–1983: lecture 27, pt. 3).

The updated Deleuzian sign table adds 14 types: extinction and bipolar composition signs for each image (perception, affection, impulse, action—large/small form, reflection, mental). When Deleuze omits the extinction sign, we use the name of its corresponding genesis sign. When bipolar signs are unnamed—as with the mental—we combine the names of the first- and second-pole signs.

TYPES OF SIGNS	TRIADS						
	PERCEPTION- IMAGE (0)	AFFECTION- IMAGE (1)	IMPULSE- IMAGE (1-2)	ACTION- IMAGE (LARGE FORM) (2)	ACTION- IMAGE (SMALL FORM) (2)	REFLECTION- IMAGE (2-3)	MENTAL- IMAGE (RELATION) (3)
SIGN OF EXTINCTION	GRAM or ENGRAM 0(0)'(0)"	QUALISIGN of EMPTINESS 1(1)'(1)"	SYMPTON 1-2(1-2)'(1-2)"	IMPRESS- ION 2(2)'(2)"	VECTOR or LINE OF UNIVERS E 2(2)'(2)"	DISCURSIVE (sign) 2-3(2-3)'(2-3)"	SYMBOL 3(3)'(3)"
SIGN OF BIPOLAR COMPOSITION	DICISIGN 0(0)'(0)"	ICON or DIVIDUAL 1(1)'(1)"	FETISH 1-2(1-2)'(1-2)"	BINOMIAL 2(2)'(2)"	INDEX 2(2)'(2)"	FIGURE 2-3(2-3)'(2-3)"	(DE)MARK 3(3)'(3)"

Table 7. Deleuze's fourteen types of signs: signs of extinction and bipolar signs of movement-image

The notation and illustration for the fourteen signs of extinction and bipolar signs follow the same criteria previously adopted to define the signs of genesis and of composition. The definitions are omitted, and the examples will be linked to film clips rather than film stills in order to be concise.

Signs of perception:

- a) sign of extinction – **0(0)'(0)"** – gram or engram – *Anticipation of the Night* (Brakhage 1958)
- b) sign of bipolar composition – **0(0)'(0)"** – dicensign – *Vaudeville or Variétés* (Dupont 1932)

Signs of Affection:

- a) sign of extinction – **1(1)'(1)"** – qualisign of emptiness – *The Eclipse* (Antonioni 1962)
- b) sign of bipolar composition – **1(1)'(1)"** – icon or dividual – *The Scarlet Empress* (von Sternberg 1934)

Signs of impulse:

- a) sign of extinction – **1-2(1-2)'(1-2)"** – symptom – *Queen Kelly* (von Stroheim 1932)
- b) sign of bipolar composition – **1-2(1-2)'(1-2)"** – fetish – *Viridiana* (Buñuel 1961)

Signs of Action:

- a) signs of extinction – **2(2)'(2)"**
 - a.1. large form – **2(2)'(2)"** – impression – *On the Waterfront* (Kazan 1954)
 - a.2. small form – **2(2)'(2)"** – vector or line of the universe – *Ugetsu Monogatari* (Mizoguchi 1953)
- b) signs of bipolar composition – **2(0)'(0)"**
 - b.1. large form – **2(2)'(2)"** – binomial – *M* (F. Lang, 1931)
 - b.2. small form – **2(2)'(2)"** – index – *A Woman of Paris* (Chaplin 1923)

Signs of Reflection:

- a) sign of extinction – **2-3(2-3)'(0)"** – discursive (sign) – *A King in New York* (Chaplin 1957)
- b) sign of bipolar composition of reflection – **2-3(2-3)'(2-3)"** – figure – *Aguirre* (Herzog 1972) and *Fitzcarraldo* (Herzog 1982)

Signs of the Mental:

- a) sign of extinction of the mental – **3(3)'(3)"** – symbol – *Mr and Mrs Smith* (Hitchcock 1941)
- b) sign of bipolar composition of the mental – **3(3)'(3)"** – (de)mark – *Blackmail* (Hitchcock 1929)

4. Even further

Cinema signs must follow a logical classification encoding movement as core meaning. Deleuze's signs integrate Peirce's triadic categories (1, 2, 3) within the generative movement of (0). Inserting Zeroness into Peirce's categories – (0 \subset 0, 1, 1-2, 2-3, 3) – enables new logical combinations, allowing Deleuze to rework Peirce's system: "We will have to compare the classification of images and signs that we propose with Peirce's great classification: why do they not coincide?" (Deleuze 1985: 69). This grounds cinema's semiosis in triadic movement.

Following Peirce, Deleuze links Zeroness to the phenomena-image—perception—which encompasses the six other movement-images: affection, impulse, action (large/small), reflection, and mental. These seven classes are structured by Peirce's triadic relation and occupy 2–5 positions: genesis/extinction, universal variation pole, center of indetermination pole, and/or bipolar composition. From these, up to 35 movement-image signs are defined, exemplified, and illustrated.

Can these classes be expanded more?

Peirce defines ten sign-classes: (111), (112), (122), (113), (123), (222), (133), (233), (333). In Deleuze's system, alongside the coinciding Peircean classes (111), (222), (333)—each with five signs—and the generative intracategorical class (000), there are two transcategorical classes (1-21-21-2), (2-32-32-3), and fifteen intercategorical classes: (001), (001-2), (002), (002-3), (003), (011), (011-2), (012), (012-3), (013), (01-22), (022), (023), (02-33), (033). Altogether, there are 21 movement-image classes: 4 intracategorical, 2 transcategorical, 15 intercategorical.

Peirce's sign classes can be encoded via Deleuze's cinematic logic. For example, (123)—a rhematic indexical legisign ("a demonstrative pronoun")—combines a quality (1) as interpretant, a thing (2) as object, and a law (3) as representamen. As each Deleuzian image class has five signs, Peirce's (123) maps to 5 signs of affection, action, and mental images—totaling 125 signs. The (123) sign includes 1(1)'(1)" (qualisign of disconnection), 2(2)'(2)" (impression), and 3(3)'(3)" (symbol), forming the intercategorical sign [1(1)'(1)"][2(2)'(2)"][3(3)'(3)"], or disconnective-impressive qualisymbol.

If each intercategorical class contains 125 signs, the 15 such classes expand Deleuze's original 35-sign table to 1,875 movement-image signs. This new Deleuzian realm of cinema signs is enabled by the precision and power of Peirce's triadic logic:

The pattern of adicities [monadic, dyadic, triadic] is striking. It could easily be extended for any finite number of trichotomies, and we would expect that it should be so extended for any additional trichotomies germane to signs analysis. We would expect such an extension, just as we would expect that an inverse square law, found to apply to the solar system, will apply to other planetary systems. (Short 2007: 237)

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