

## ***The politics of landscape: space, displacement, and territory***

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### **Abstract**

This paper explores the relationship between landscape and territory, proposing that landscape be understood as a deterritorialized experience of the Earth in which semiotically structured spaces disorient and individuated bodies dissolve. Drawing on Deleuze's notion of the telluric image, I argue that landscape is not mere scenery but the incorporeal plane of composition from which difference and becoming arise against the rigidity of structured space. As both experience and expression, images of the Earth reveal its power as place and habitable space, exposing landscape as a problem in act and a fundamental aesthetic concept. Ultimately, the telluric image emerges as an affective rupture: a moment when the terrestrial destabilizes territory, displaces ground, and reconfigures subjectivity.

### **Keywords**

Telluric image, Territory, Deleuze and Guattari, Semiotics, Aesthetics.

### **Introduction**

In this paper I examine the relationship between the concepts of landscape and territory. I contend that landscape should be understood as the deterritorialization of the Earth where all semiotically structured spaces become disoriented, as well as all individuated bodies become disorganized, or their subjectivity dissolved. Ultimately, in line with how Deleuze defines the telluric image, I claim that the aesthetic experience of landscape is key in the emergence of new forms of subjectivity, and with them, new peoples and possibilities, since landscape is not merely scenery (nor its perception), but also the virtual, incorporeal plane of composition from which difference and becoming surge against the repetition and rigidity of structured space.

In other words, in this paper I set out to articulate a series of guidelines for defining the landscape as the point of encounter between the human experience of space and the impersonal forces that shape the terrestrial milieu. Rather than conceiving the telluric image as an object or a representation, the following reflections approach it as both experience and expression. Images of the Earth, whether visual, auditory, or literary, are

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expressions of its power, for they make visible its condition as place and habitable space, thereby revealing landscape not simply as a thematic concern but as a problem, as a fundamental aesthetic concept that entails an implicit semiotic of space. Therefore, the telluric image is the expression that destabilizes the structured territorial constitution of our environment and exposes the abyssal separation between the ways in which space is inhabited and the forms generated through such inhabitation. Landscape, in this sense, is defined as an event: the moment in which the Earth expresses itself in its irreducible dimension, that is, as a no-place or desert that exceeds all linguistic substances. Approached in this way, images of the land can be regarded as living expressions that confront the very condition of beings who dwell and occupy space, who are and possess places, and who exist as embodied and reticulated subjectivities. Lastly, I wish to point out that the focus of this inquiry will remain on the telluric image as an artistic expression, privileging its audio-visual manifestations while leaving aside, for the moment, its auditory (soundscapes) and literary variants.

The hypothesis that guides this approach, then, is that whereas territory organizes space through distances, places, and movements that configure subjectivity according to semiotic and sociopolitical norms, the telluric image emerges as an affective rupture of these structures, a moment in which the Earth disorients itself and, in doing so, displaces the stability of our ontogenetical ground. In effect, these images position thought at the margins of its own territory by confronting it with a telluric force that surpasses any form of appropriation, constituting a zone of crossing where an individuated space and time become entangled with what remains exterior to them. The telluric image thus arises when the terrestrial interrupts both the linearity of time and the order of forms, revealing a creative and non-representational dimension of dwelling.

### **Territory: signs and power**

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that space is shaped by the semiotic and linguistic regimes imposed by a dominant political power. This has been extensively covered, be it by studies that focus on the semiotic aspect of space and social distancing (Aliana 2010; Colebrook 2020; Aurora 2017; Caló 2020), the geographical intricacies of thinking territory as such (Mcnamara 2018; Monclus e.a. 2019; Lundy 2013), the political and philosophical outcome of such a theory (Schleusener 2021; Collet 2020; Protevi 2006), or even the relationship between territory and artistic expression (for instance, Grosz 2003; 2008). Of all that it has been said, I would like to focus on the importance of claiming that the meaningful distance that structures and divides people within a culture is grounded by the control a major political force has on language. Accordingly, I wish to start by briefly analysing the distinction between smooth and striat-

ed space, as well as the process of stratification by which Deleuze and Guattari describe the dynamism to which this elemental dichotomy of territory and the territorializing act is subjected.

Territory, in spatial terms, is the assemblage of a smooth space that is constantly being translated and traversed by a striated space, which, in turn, is being reversed, drawn back toward a smooth space. This means that these two modes of spatiality exist only in mixture. This follows from the processual nature of territory: as act and machine, territory has its own forces, those condensed from chaos. These forces drive bodies into an assemblage that enforces the interaction between things, from which structures surge. All territories, then, are composed by the forces of territorialization. Territorialization is then the process that constitutes every territory by consolidating a certain rhythmic composition, or assemblage of various forces that populate the expanse chaotically, unrestrictedly interacting with one another. Now, it so happens that this assemblage of forces, materials, affects and expressions contains within itself the germ of machines that can dismantle the territory, that is, machines that form the flow of absolute and infinite space and time that the territorial machine cuts. In other words, not only are there machines of territorialization, but also machines of dismantlement. When any territory, along with its bodies and territorialized machines, succumbs to these opposing forces, the process of deterritorialization takes place. This very process has its counterpart, namely reterritorialization, that is, when those disseminated bodies, those affects that have been cast into chaos, that have been forced to plunge into the no-place of pure, intensive space, are once again singularized, individuated, and territorialized. In short, all forms of reterritorialization presuppose the deterritorializing act. Broadly speaking then, smooth space is the amorphous ensemble, the informal and pre-figural set of spatial intensities that are susceptible to become place. It is a *nomos* without folds, a cradle of chaotic forces, a plane of immanence. On the contrary, striated space is always a *logos*, meaning a cohesively consolidated sum of fixed structural assignments:

The striated is that which intertwines fixed and variable elements, produces an order and succession of distinct forms, and organizes horizontal melodic lines and vertical harmonic planes. The smooth is the continuous variation, continuous development of form; it is the fusion of harmony and melody in favour of the production of properly rhythmic values, the pure act of the drawing of a diagonal across the vertical and the horizontal. (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 478)

This explains why those dimensions of space that we experience, that we perceive as the fundament of our interactions within our milieux do not always coincide with a structured territory; because, when we live space, it becomes smooth and unmoored, it becomes a place of intensities, of winds and noises, of “forces, and sonorous and tactile qualities, as in the desert, steppe, or ice” (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 479). Therefore, stri-

ated space is the expanse as covered by visual qualities, measures and geosymbols that, while deriving from chaotic forces, tend to suppress all exceeding potentialities by axiomatizing them through quantifying structures, such as kilometres, densities, atmospheric pressures, and formulas. Thus, while the chaotic and smooth space holds the power to interrupt all territorializing structures and codes, striated space, by contrast, attempts to establish a navigable cartography, assigning fixed qualities and leaving aside expressive affects. Smooth and striated are then modes of spatialization, of how the body is (and must be) in space and how space is experienced. We may act freely in a smooth space, however it would not be “us” who act in it, since all action supposes the construction of a striated space, where the earth is tilled, individuals constituted and planes of immanence consolidated.

So, the important question here is, how is the smooth landscape striated? How are these intervals constructed? It is at this point that Deleuze and Guattari introduce their pragmatic ontolinguistics. Every territory is consolidated through a specific process, called stratification, which is “the continuous creation of the world from chaos” (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 502). Stratification is based on the double articulation of language, that of content and that of expression. This is by no means an arbitrary linguistic definition of space, indeed, there is a correlation between the striation of space and the semiotic codification of the territory, which is, in turn, grounded in politics. In essence, stratification is the semiotic process through which a multiplicity is individuated within a concrete state of affairs; for example, the prison that confines inmates is a process whereby dispersed singularities are stratified by means of a punitive machine that captures and groups them. This interaction between semiotics and politics derives from one of the main purposes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, which is to further develop the Deleuzian project of refuting the “representational” condition that underlies structuralism. This can be seen in the displacement suffered by the notion of “structure” in favour of that of “machine”, pioneered by Guattari, that builds upon *Logic of sense*, where Deleuze seeks to resolve the problem of sense as a surface effect. Indeed, note how, already in Deleuze’s seminal text, the notion of “structure” is associated with that of “machine,” which produces an incorporeal sense:

Authors referred to as ‘structuralists’ by recent practice may have no essential point in common other than this: sense, regarded not at all as appearance but as surface effect and position effect, and produced by the circulation of the empty square in the structural series. [...] Structuralism, whether consciously or not, celebrates new findings of a Stoic and Carrollian inspiration. Structure is in fact a machine for the production of incorporeal sense (*skindapsos*). But when structuralism shows in this manner that sense is produced by nonsense and its perpetual displacement, and that it is born of the respective position of elements which are not by themselves ‘signifying’, we should not at all compare it with what was called the philosophy of the ab-

surd: Carroll, yes; Camus, no. (Deleuze 1990: 71)

For the authors, then, structuralism is based on a specific linguistic conception: that there is no structure other than that of language, disregarding its esoteric or non-verbal uses. For example, there is a structure of the unconscious because the unconscious is linguistic; there is a bodily structure insofar as bodies are analysed as if they spoke a language, that of symptoms. Things in themselves have no other structure than a silent discourse. Consequently, structuralism has the inherent tendency to treat all aspects of the human condition as systematic, and therefore as linguistically structured. This means that both the non-linguistic elements of the spoken word, its reality and sonorous parts, as well as the images and concepts associated with it, presuppose an element, a structural object, that undergirds all these extra-linguistic components. Indeed, there is a structural dimension that grounds the analogy between thought (as linguistic exercise) and reality. This dimension is that of the symbolic. A dimension that is neither formal, because structure is defined by the nature of certain atomic and variable elements that are arbitrarily connected, nor essential, because it consists in a combinatory of elements that in themselves are a-symbolic. What, then, is this element of language? For Deleuze – and Guattari subsequently – ultimately it is not a symbolic structural element but the empty semiotic place filled with sense, where all possible linguistic articulations come together, from which arise the various positions and roles things assume when they are signified. This means that there is a non-sense of sense, from which sense results.

Therefore, every structure should be thought instead as a multiplicity, a pure chaotic flow that, in some way, becomes actualized. The various symbolic elements become incarnated in real beings and objects through differentiation. From this it follows that the subject is the structure, the differential relationships and the singular points that intertwine in reciprocal determination. Hence structure is a multiplicity of virtual coexistence, because all elements, relations, and values coexist in it, all the singularities proper to the domain that corresponds to it. Thus, this coexistence does not imply indeterminacy but differential relations and elements that coexist in a perfectly and completely determined whole. This means that all linguistic articulations (or semiotizations) of sense are accompanied by a symbolic instance, by an “unactualizable” structural element that follows all its displacements without occupying it. The subject is precisely this instance, making the structure what disassembles and systematically distributes subjectivity, and structuralism the discipline that dissipates and displaces it, that turns the subject into an eternal nomad, made of impersonal individuations, singularities, and continuous intensive events: subjectivity becomes pure becoming. In fact, structuralism establishes the plurivocity of Being. Thus, broadly speaking, what allows the concept of structure to be replaced by that of machine is that sense becomes not merely an effect but rather a process.

This is why Deleuze and Guattari claim that territory should be thought of as a linguis-

tic stratum, that is, an expression structured in such a way that it becomes an object of enunciation; for example, “criminality” is the object of enunciations articulated by criminal law. Hence, by the marriage of spatiality and semiotics, territory is understood not only as the shape of a plot of land, but also as the act of inhabitation via the codification of the earth. Riddled with geosymbols, with semiotic traits that marry language and earth, territory is then not only the place, but also the codifying process where diagrammatic acts make sense. This means that every territory applies to the singularities it gathers a specific articulation, one that is eminently semiotic, that there is a strict correlation between what constitutes the enunciations of territorialized bodies, the linguistic formations they express, and the representations they employ in their significations (in their semiotic contents). Therefore, any act that causes the dissolution of the subject, be it a collective enunciation or any other, entails the flight from the territory, because it is the dismantling of the bond between the visible and the sayable by which the territory is consolidated, by which bodies are structured and organized on the basis of repetition and representation.

From this it follows that territory is composed of a set of words, propositions, or speech acts that are formally regulated by a power that then gathers them into a corpus. Thus, stratification is the ensembling of passages and rules of passage that allow the codification of a multiplicity. Unlike a sentence, which is characterized by having a subject of enunciation that manifests as the grammatical person who utters it, enunciation is the structuring of multiplicities in which both the subject of enunciation and the enunciated subject lose all meaning whatsoever, since it is a practice, a semiotic operation upon multiplicities inhabiting the plane of immanence. Now, territory can also be enunciated as the multiplicity that it is, since an enunciation pertinent to the chaos that nourishes it can arise from it: there exist collective agents of enunciation, which are themselves multiplicities. In effect, because an enunciation may refer to a subject (albeit at the risk of referring to many subjects), or even to the whole multiplicity that could assume the single grammatical position of subject in the sentence, the act of enunciation is defined by the set of subject-positions to which it refers. In sum, every enunciation is itself a multiplicity that refers to other enunciations connected to it. A single enunciation is already immersed in multiple systems and refers to various codes; it is already a discursive multiplicity whose historical formation derives from a particular way in which things and visibilities are interwoven to constitute an enunciable structuration that captures dispersed singular forces.

Consequently, Deleuze and Guattari contend the structuralist idea that language is the human faculty that manifests itself at the intersection between the speech act and thought, that is, that the element of language is the sign, insofar as it is representative. According to this view, linguistics is thus an analytical method that collects and interprets data, separating what is essential from what is accidental or extrinsic to language.

As structuralist André Martinet notes, this follows from the fact that language is a human faculty that results from the experience and natural exercise of one or more organs; it is also an institution, a product of life in society. Language is the faculty of communication, and the essential function of this instrument is to communicate and to forge a territory where information has meaning and is easily transmitted. Through conversation one shares a specific vision of what is given, namely the world. Thus, language serves as a support for thought, “to the point that one could ask if any mental activity that lacks a linguistic frame could be properly named thought” (Martinet, 1980, p. 9). This means that human experience becomes analysable and differentiable with respect to each community by means of units of semantic content and phonetic expression, for example, monemes. In this way, following Benveniste, every linguistic system, or every use of language, is composed of formal elements articulated in variable combinations “following certain structural principles” (Benveniste 1966: 21).

So, what Deleuze and Guattari are trying to challenge is this idea that structure is the form of the linguistic system, namely the linguistic faculty itself, and that is progressively discovered as its basic elements become known. Because, according to this theory, insofar as it is a coding and structural system, language is a specific set of relations and oppositions that elements maintain both among themselves and with others, and so the faculty that structures and shapes these systems is language. Ultimately, the main quip the authors have is regarding the hypothesis that the structural element of every language is twofold. That, on the one hand, there are the basic signifying units—namely, the signs themselves; and that, on the other, these units are composed of nonsignifying and arbitrary elements, namely phonemes. Being structured and coded, all signs perform functions within the linguistic system, that is, they (re)produce reality. The main question is, then, where does this representational capacity of the sign come from? Systematically, from the human faculty and condition of symbolization. Indeed, in general terms, structuralism argues that the human being is primarily symbolic, it [re]presents the real by means of a sign and understands the sign as representative of the real, thereby establishing a relation of signification between one thing and another.

So, how is this contested? In the first place, according to the authors, it is none other than the State who codifies the smooth space through laws, institutions, and linguistic codes, for it is the State what allows centres of power to be distributed across the plane of immanence, granting a certain consistency to the singularities it forcibly gathers. The State is the simplest structure by which a culture can maintain a relation with the outside; it is the first form of membrane a society fabricates:

The law of the State is not the law of All or Nothing (State societies or counter-State societies) but that of interior and exterior. The State is sovereignty. But sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of internalizing, of appropriating locally. Not only is there no universal State, but the outside of States cannot be reduced to "foreign

policy," that is, to a set of relations among States. The outside appears simultaneously in two directions: huge worldwide machines branched out over the entire ecumenon at a given moment, which enjoy a large measure of autonomy in relation to the States (for example, commercial organization of the "multi national" type, or industrial complexes, or even religious formations like Christianity, Islam, certain prophetic or messianic movements, etc.); but also the local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities, which continue to affirm the rights of segmentary societies in opposition to the organs of State power." (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 360)

Therefore, the State operates as the Same, as the form of totalizing interiority capable of reproducing itself while remaining identical, since it does not vary in any of its iterations. In short, the State establishes the rhythm by which the smooth space can be measured and thus representationally articulated. As the State establishes the semiotic means for transferring and communicating the existence of a cadence, of a territory, space is produced through assemblages of signs, meanings, and forces, founded in a specific exercise of Power. This is why the State is deeply rooted in what constitutes a majority, which is the constant of expression or of content that serves as the standard measure by which to evaluate any chaotic force that erupts into the territory. Territory is therefore a process and act constituted primarily by a clustering of forces, where the major force assumes a state of power and domination because it is the standard measure, the cadence by which the territorial rhythm is constructed. This, in turn, creates the minority, since "a determination different from that of the constant will therefore be considered minoritarian, by nature and regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or an outsystem" (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 105). Hence, the majority, based on the capture of political power, becomes the regulative structuration of everything: what is territorialized is in fact structured according to the majority. So, every territory subdues the chaotic forces of each individual by making of their body a medium of inscription, recording, and coding:

The law of the State is not the law of All or Nothing (State societies or counter-State societies) but that of interior and exterior. The State is sovereignty. But sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of internalizing, of appropriating locally. Not only is there no universal State, but the outside of States cannot be reduced to "foreign policy," that is, to a set of relations among States. The outside appears simultaneously in two directions: huge worldwide machines branched out over the entire ecumenon at a given moment, which enjoy a large measure of autonomy in relation to the States (for example, commercial organization of the "multinational" type, or industrial complexes, or even religious formations like Christianity, Islam, certain prophetic or messianic movements, etc.); but also the local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities, which continue to affirm the rights of segmentary societies in opposition to the organs of State power. (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 360)

Hence, territory is based upon a standard form of communication. Basically, every territory is striated because the socius that inhabits it is somewhat part of a major political structure, that of Power and Domination. Majority does not refer to a greater relative quantity but to the determination of a state in relation to which larger quantities, as well as the smallest, can be said to be minoritarian; it simply implies a state of domination and control. Semiotically speaking, the major political power that constitutes (and consolidates) the state, and thus the territory, determines what is expected one can utter – and enunciate –, and thus to what extent one can linguistically operate. In essence, as argued by Susana Caló, the main point of Deleuzo-Guattarian semiotics is to reconnect language to its practice by constructing a framework “that includes an analysis of how language is inseparable from a concrete world that affects it and which it also affects” (Caló 2021: 269). To this end, it is necessary to identify the practice that establishes the connection between what is said and what is meant, because ignoring the pragmatic nature of language means neglecting the socio-political form through which it is enunciated. This derives from Deleuze and Guattari leaning towards pragmatics over structuralist linguistics (whose main figure, for the authors, is Noam Chomsky). On the one hand, pragmatics is concrete, while generative grammar is abstract. Indeed, pragmatics describes the actual workings of language in a concrete situation, such as a conversation, whereas Chomskyan grammar deals with levels of abstraction “quite beyond the ordinary speaker's experience of his own language.” (Lecercle 1987: 22). On the other hand, pragmatics remains within a material domain, whereas generative grammar is based on idealist conceptions: according to pragmatism, every enunciative act does things, bringing about changes in the experience of reality.

This inclination towards pragmatism as a contrasting force against structuralism, inherent to *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* as well as to *What is philosophy?*, has been extensively covered by Paolo Fabbri and Federico Montanari, among others. Indeed, the Italian authors have stressed the importance of C. S. Peirce in the configuration of deleuzo-guattarian pragmatics in the contention of structuralist semiotics. However, both Fabbri and Montanari – Francesco Marsciani (2015) withal – have also stressed in what ways do Deleuze and Guattari distance themselves from this early form of pragmatism in order to concoct their own version of it. For example, according to Fabbri, rather than Peirce being instrumental in the construction of the diagram as a concept, it is Michel Foucault's *panopticon* what provides the Frenchmen the idea that there can be modulation in semiotics:

the diagram results from an spatialized inscription of abstract and creative characteristics of transformative virtualities. The diagram belongs to the order of the virtual, which becomes actual by bringing new possibilities into being; it does not represent merely static relations but dynamic ones; it correlates planes of expression and of content and establishes the operative conditions for possible transformations. A

dispositif of regulated metamorphoses. (Fabbri 2015: 28)

This form of “pure semiotics”, as Fabbri calls it, however, does stem, at least to an extent, from Deleuze’s and Guattari’s reading of Peirce, albeit with certain distortions. As Montanari suggests, there is a clear intention from Deleuze to “operate” with and on Peirce, forcing some renversements and “reorganizing some ideas” (Montanari 2014: 71). Indeed, deleuzo-guattarian pragmatics consist on posing questions and problems, a shared interest with Peirce, since “for Deleuze, in particular, as for Peirce, the specific, non generic attitude is: whom does this particular problem lead me to encounter? With which ‘philosophi-conceptual characters’? how can I outline the nature and form of this encounter? And what does this encounter produce” (Montanari 2014: 73). If philosophy, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is the activity of inventing and transforming concepts, activity that produces encounters and is, at the same time, produced by them, which are forged on the basis of problems, if philosophy is that, it is because they find in Peirce and Bergson not only a way to redefine signs and representations (as images) but also a way to classify them and make them useful.

In addition, as Caló points out, one of Deleuze and Guattari’s main sources in their rebuttal of chomskian structuralism is William Labov’s philosophy of language, that argues for an intrinsic linguistic component that affects each system from within, causing it to escape or leap by its own power, preventing it from enclosing. These components exist as linguistic variations, which can be phonetic, phonological, syntactic, semantic, or stylistic. In addition to this, as underlined by Grisham (1991), another important figure here is Valentin Voloshinov, who highlights the structuralist inability to grasp the event-like nature of language. Voloshinov argues that language is a system of normatively identical forms that standardize each unique and specific act of speech. That is, that the speaker is concerned with a particular way of deploying their linguistic faculty—one that allows them to shape and communicate a given signified and its context. They are not interested in the constants of form but in its flexibility and adaptability. The same applies to the interlocutor, who is not concerned with recognizing the employed form (for example, whether it is grammatically acceptable or syntactically correct) but with understanding; within the specific context of communication, the meaning of what is being said: the interest is in recognizing novelty, not identity. In other words, there is no homogeneous linguistic community where all speakers express themselves in the same way. If anything, what becomes the model and paradigm for analysis is an axiomatic representation of the empty forms that speakers use to communicate, which is far from the actual use of linguistic faculty. Thus, it is necessary to find the practice that connects what is said to what is meant, both synchronically and diachronically, because ignoring the pragmatic nature of language means disregarding the socio-political form through which it is enunciated. In essence, each individual, insofar as they are territorialized, bears the insignia of their territory.

Furthermore, this ontosemiotic theory of Deleuze and Guattari is based, in part, on the Hjelmslevian linguistic distinction between expression and content, whose primary objective is, according to the authors, the reversal of linguistic structuralism. Indeed, Louis Hjelmslev defines language as a system of relations between forms and functions, independently of the specific content of words. The systematic study of this phenomenon is glossematics. According to this, language is decomposed into invariant, minimal, and irreducible semiotic units, called glossemes. Consequently, instead of uniting signified and signifier in the sign, defined as an entity generated by the connection between an expression and a content. Hjelmslev maintains that the domains of expression and content are functors (entities that have a function in relation to something else) which contract the semiotic function, their existence being merely operative within the formal constitution of language. Between a function and these functors there is total solidarity, since one cannot conceive of a linguistic function without these terms, which are the extremities of language.<sup>1</sup>

For example, if the same entity contracts different functions within the linguistic structure, it is the different functors which, depending on the perspective assumed, generate the alternation in meaning. The semiotic function is structured by the conjunction of expression and content, which is why it could not exist without the simultaneous presence of both; just as neither an expression and its content, nor a content and its expression, could ever exist without a semiotic function binding them together. Hence, the modifications introduced by Hjelmslev radically formalize the concept of language because they eliminate concrete speech in favour of a more social concept: usage. This allows all that is differential to be placed on the side of language and all that is formal on the side of speech, thereby resolving the contradictions produced by Saussure's distinction between *langue* and *parole*, and the double semiotic articulation. Ultimately, expression is the expression of a content, and content is the content of an expression: they can only be isolated artificially, for in practice there is no content without expression, nor expression without content. From this perspective, meaning is the binding principle of the structure of language that differentiates languages from one another. As per Francesco Marsciani, hjelmslevian semiotics are based upon the idea that there is a linguistic plane of immanence that prevents the risk of making all semiotic relationships strictly internal to language. Indeed, for Hjelmslev, there is a transversality in language, a plane not only "where the opposing elements lie, that is, the intrinsic elements (elements authentically linguistic), but the one in which the theory finds, more radically, a transcendental horizon" (Marsciani 2015: 166). This means that language is not exclusively a matter of competence, syntax nor grammar, its generativity is not solely semiotic. In the words of Marsciani, "language is a formal hierarchy of functions that theory deductively

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<sup>1</sup> Another source for this rethinking of the grammar and syntactic structure of language is Gustave Guillaume, albeit to a lesser extent.

reconstructs, and the substances that make up the empirical appearance of the phenomenon [...] are secondary and derivative inasmuch as they are ‘realizations of possibilities’” (2015: 167).

Now, if we think of territory as a semiotic entity, this means that the set of corporeal modifications that occur within it is distinguished from incorporeal transformations, or effects, they produce, since each corresponds to a distinct formalization: one of content and one of expression respectively. Therefore, content and expression have their own form, expanding into fragmented series in which there is neither correspondence nor conformity, but rather solidarity. Both formalizations are independent and heterogeneous, the form of expression being constituted by the concatenation of statements, and that of content by the fabric of bodies. Hence, to express the incorporeal attribute that arises from the encounter of bodies with one another is itself the formal intervention of language, that is, it is a proper linguistic act. This is the process of stratification. From then on, expressions insert themselves into and intervene in contents to anticipate them, to join them or separate them in another way, and to provoke a different structuration. In this regard, the forms of content and expression are inseparable from a movement of deterritorialization that carries them along. There are degrees of deterritorialization that traverse and quantify the ways in which contents and expressions are conjoined or stabilized in a reterritorialization. These degrees are the variables of content and expression and the internal factors of enunciation. Hence, an assemblage is that which includes the two segments of enunciation: on the one hand, as machinic assemblage of bodies; on the other, as incorporeal transformations attributed to them. Likewise, the assemblage has reterritorialized parts that stabilize it and maximum points of deterritorialization that draw it toward complete destratification.

The deterritorialization of the form of content implies the erection of a semiotic machine, that is, a machine that cuts into the linguistic flow inhabiting the plane of immanence. Such a machine relates directly to the whole of the assemblage and is wholly indifferent to the signifying structures of the form of content: neither the content is a signified, nor the expression a signifier, but both are variables of the assemblage. The model assumed by this machinic assemblage is precisely that of a rhizome, where the univocity of terms and their signification breaks apart in order to form a multiplicity of asignifying connections. From this perspective, it follows that territory is inherently rhythmic, because it is the set of discontinuous series of events and fragments of time characterized by disturbances and changes. Rather than a harmonious homeostasis, a territory is a metastable state, a concentration of force and intense energy constantly on the verge of dissolution. However, as discussed above, territory is not simply the combination of milieus and rhythms through coded patterns, it is rather the act that affects them, the force that territorializes them. A territory borrows matter and qualities from all its constitutive milieus; it captures them corporeally by coding their flesh, it is constructed out of

aspects, portions, perceptions, and affections of multiple milieux: a house, for example, is built from dung, soil, grass, and the humidity proper to the Earth, which are modulated by territorial forces through which these singular matters enter into composition. As Calvacante notes, to understand this idea of deterritorializing semiotic fluxes as minor political and territorial powers, it is important to comprehend that territory is “a space that carries a signature, that is, that distinguishes itself from the ‘outside’ through the way its machines and semiotics produce flows” (2023: 3). In other words, territory is directly related to the machines and the regimes of signs that they operate.

Thus, territory is at once the emergence of matters of expression and their transformation (coding) into contents, it is the formation of linguistic substances from, on the one hand, qualities that are not themselves representative, and, on the other, the communication of these qualities through semiotic representations. In a way, although territory is primarily a coding of matter (that is, the elaboration of meaning from interlaced bodies) it is not, nor can it be, mere coding. As a process, territory must sustain some form of decoding; otherwise, it stagnates, since its membranes can no longer adapt and no further territorialization occur. Because territory still belongs to the Earth (the multiplicity of chaotic forces dramatized in the world) every territory remains susceptible to ungrounding. Territory may expand, contract, or undergo drastic change: it is therefore sustained by rhythm and by the intensive difference that consolidates it. This is the reason why neither milieu nor rhythm alone constitutes a territory, for a territory emerges only through the aggregation of matters of expression that delineate it and that unfold into territorial motifs and landscapes.

This coincides with Hjelmslev’s view regarding the analogous relation between the substance and form of content and the substance and form of expression, according to which, “if we pass within the indicated order (forward or backward) from one of these four compartments to another, we can make the same observations for each trajectory” (1959: 40). Indeed, Hjelmslev argues for the introduction of a concept to express the articulation of the laws that regulate the relations among these magnitudes, for there is no term that refers to this interweaving of the various dimensions of language.<sup>2</sup> Such concept is stratification, a process in which these dimensions stand in relation as strata (stratum-a). This gives Deleuze and Guattari the key to challenge the structuralist necessity that every language is a communication of signification, since it is possible for an assemblage to possess borders through which significations escape or flee, exiting the “territory” or semiotic stratification to which they are bound as statements. Pure expression may exist, even though forms of content and expression are inseparable from the forces of the territory that assembles them; this includes bodies, which, in order to be enunciated or to describe their state, are traversed by the grid of territorializing political power. The question is, then, how does this passage from content to pure expression reverber-

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<sup>2</sup> Which are four: the form and substance of content and the form and substance of expression.

ate in the carnal element of every territory, as well as of every individuated statement: in flesh and in its spaces?

It is at this point that the deleuzo-guattarian passage from structure to machine comes to use. Defined as a system of cuts, the machine operates in variable dimensions over a continuous material flow. In this sense, a 'semiotic machine' establishes cuts in the linguistic flow, for example, the numerous phonemes susceptible to coding. Furthermore, machines are not isolated but form part of a system that intercedes and encodes the continuous and intense flow composed of various singularities. Thus, every machine is, in some way, a machine of a machine, insofar as it belongs to a stitching, or filum, that forms a machinic assemblage. In short, every machine is a cut of flow with respect to the one it is connected to, but it is itself a flow or production of flow with respect to the one that connects to it. Broadly speaking, a machine is an aggregate of heterogeneous singularities united by territorial forces, and each machinic act is the determination of these forces in a necessary configuration. Each cut processes a new assemblage, bringing together heterogeneous forces dispersed in a territory. Therefore, a territory is a "homogenizing" stratum that articulates and structures chaotic dispersion. So, when the flow is cut, the machine processes a new assemblage that gathers the heterogeneous forces dispersed outside the territory. Consequently, every linguistic act is intrinsically connected to the social, political, and cultural processes that stratify and territorialize it, as structuring is linked to fundamental extra-linguistic or non-discursive semiotic processes. Hence,

every milieu is coded, a code being defined by periodic repetition; but each code is in a perpetual state of transcoding or transduction. Transcoding or transduction is the manner in which one milieu serves as the basis for another, or conversely is established atop another milieu, dissipates in it or is constituted in it. The notion of the milieu is not unitary: not only does the living thing continually pass from one milieu to another, but the milieus pass into one another; they are essentially communicating. The milieus are open to chaos, which threatens them with exhaustion or intrusion. Rhythm is the milieus' answer to chaos. (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 313)

Territory is then the emergence of matters of expression, that is qualities that are not representative in themselves. For instance, a protrusion at the back of an animal, the colouring of its chest, or the raise of its ears, are all expression of change: something has passed a territorial marking, space's configuration has shifted and reclaims for a behavioural sudden change. In a way, although territory is primarily a coding of matter, that is the crafting of a meaning from intertwined bodies, it is not, nor it can be just codification: the territory can expand, contract, change drastically, because it is held together by rhythm and intensive difference. This is why neither milieu nor rhythm constitute themselves a territory, because it is produced by the aggregate of matters of expression that

draws a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes, which is what Deleuze and Guattari call a refrain [*ritournelle*].

In short, the refrain is the expressivity that arises from the distances held by a living being as it interacts with the landscape it finds itself in. As Zourabichvili notes, the refrain is a trait of expression “that corresponds to a case, or circumstance, that we only sing when the hour has come” (1994: 116), it is a sign that marks a specific extension, a sign of difference that has the capacity to remain undisturbed regarding the outside land, from which it distinguishes itself without detaching. In other words, an individual can only become expressive insofar as they remain somehow ‘outside’ the territory that subjects them to a strict signification—to representing a specific content. This way, linguistic structuration occurs when form is projected onto sense; when a specific form of expression and content is applied to an uninterrupted semiotic surface: sense.

### **The inhabited space: Territory and Land**

Territory is then the place where things become fixed, thus constituting the structural basis for every implementation of representations. In other words, within the territory, everything is meaningful and signifying, susceptible to the semiotic double articulation through which the various elements of the world can be informed and communicated with ease, insofar as they become representable. This allows the world to be physically transversed, because per signs we represent the Earth as an amalgam of infinite places where we can project different and coexisting bodily instances. We can trace paths because we exercise over the physical world a semiotic articulation that enables both smooth and striated spaces to coexist. In other words, as Carl Schmitt remarks in *Land and sea*, we derive our points of view from the “firmly-grounded Earth” (1997: 1), insofar as human existence is fundamentally conditioned by the material elements of it, which constitute not just physical environments but also distinct matrices of political, juridical, and cultural formation. Indeed, Earth appears as the primordial element of human life: it provides orientation, stability, and the conditions for settlement, thereby enabling the emergence of agriculture, fixed borders, and the territorial structures that Schmitt gathers under the concept of *nomos*:

Every basic order is a spatial order. To talk of the constitution of a country or a continent is to talk of its fundamental order, of its *nomos*. The true, the authentic, rests essentially upon distinct spatial delimitations. It presupposes clear dimensions, a precise division of the planet. The beginning of every great era coincides with an extensive territorial appropriation. Every important change in the image of Earth is inseparable from a political transformation, and so, from a new repartition of the planet, a new territorial appropriation. (Schmitt 1997: 37)

Henceforth, territory is the act that affects the various distances between the bodies that populate a given spatial extension. The way in which territory affects these distances is by gridding and structuring them, so that individuated, and temporally sustained entities can exist. Territory allows me to establish coordinates and axes through which bodies and events can be identified, because it is where individuals and their spatial liaisons are referenceable and semiotically representable. Territory is thus a point in the world susceptible to reference. As part of a territory, then, individuals are structural components of a whole. In spatial terms, they represent a certain longitude, their own extension or the amount of space they occupy through living and acting, and a certain latitude, that is, the degree of power with which a body affects space. Society is therefore founded on territory, since it is the process through which any parcel of land acquires reasonable structure and meaning. Without coding, without a geographical axiom that allows understanding and communication, there can be no society. Thus, territory is the act that “affects milieus and rhythms, that ‘territorializes’ them” (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 314). Brief, if the distances between individuals in a society have meaning, it is because they are part of a Same—that is, of a structure that grids them, for example through a language.

This means that the interval between one body and another in the territory conveys and represents a regulated but overall fluid meaning, that is, all bodies inscribed by a territory manage their distances, which are in turn qualitatively intensive: closer or farther signifies, in a Western society, a higher or lower degree of privacy with respect to the body I approach or distance myself from. Yet this fluidity is often regulated, for society is always spatially linked according to how it lives space, how it signifies it, and how it represents it. Territory is not merely a geographic structure but also a political and social one. Accordingly, territory is the process that allows heterogeneity to emerge by striating and coding a homogeneous land, because if multiple individuals gather and compose a *socius*, their differentiating distances will be combined to form a medium that comprehends them all. Nevertheless, this also means that, within the territory, each individual also loses part of their vibratory capacities, because their potential for action is affected by the permeability of the space of the other. This is because territory is primarily an amalgam of distances, rhythms, and milieus corresponding to the institution of a semiotic axiom:

Critical distance is not a meter, it is a rhythm. But the rhythm, precisely, is caught up in a becoming that sweeps up the distances between characters, making them rhythmic characters that are themselves more or less distant, more or less combinable (intervals). (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 320)

Ultimately, territories are composed of milieus and rhythms, which are in turn constituted from the forces of chaos. Indeed, as a permeable block of space-time, every territo-

ry has an excluding Outside, beyond which the world is nothing but pure chaos. Hence, as various individuals gather and compose a socius, their vibrations (or differentiating distances) will conjoin to conform a milieu that comprises them all. Thus, when territorialized, any body becomes a body as well as a subjectivity, a singular focus of activity. There is a clear interval constructed by the togetherness of cultural space; barriers that are not exclusively physical, but also psychological, political and intensive. This is because territory is mainly an assemblage of distances, of rhythms and milieus per the institution of a semiotic axiom. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari:

The territory is first of all the critical distance between two beings of the same species: Mark your distance. What is mine is first of all my distance; I possess only distances. Don't anybody touch me, I growl if anyone enters my territory, I put up placards. Critical distance is a relation based on matters of expression. It is a question of keeping at a distance the forces of chaos knocking at the door. (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 319-320)

Territory is then primarily a plane, a base for every struggle against chaos, whose forces are essentially disruptive. In other words, the chaos upon which any territory is erected is pure discordance, everlasting possibility, constant virtuality that gives oxygen to the fabrication of new territories and planes, of new specific operational selections. So, territories are built from milieus and rhythm, which are in turn constructed from forces of Chaos. Chaos is the plane where all determinations take place and vanish; it is “the impossibility of a connection between them, since one does not appear without the other having already disappeared, and one appears as disappearance when the other disappears as outline” (Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 42). Chaos is nowhere, a no-place of disarrayed forces that infinitely act upon one another; likewise, Chaos is the relationship of the unrelated, it is the connection between that which is not connected at all. Then, as Kleinherenbrink states, whatever is constructed from Chaos remains immanent to it, for essentially “Chaos refers to the fact that since reality lacks an overarching organising principle, nothing has a natural place” (Kleinherenbrink 2015: 211). If we consider Chaos to be the whole of smooth land where territories may arise, then a territory is the codification of the chaotic forces through striation, structuration, and semiotic coding, which in turn also means that

We have gone from forces of chaos to forces of the earth. From milieus to territory. From functional rhythms to the becoming-expressive of rhythm. From phenomena of transcoding to phenomena of decoding. From milieu functions to territorialized functions. It is less a question of evolution than of passage, bridges and tunnels. We saw that milieus continually pass into one another. Now we see that the milieus pass into the territory. (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 322)

So, whatever we think of space in terms of distances and intervals is the result of a consolidation of the Chaos where all living forms are immersed. Territory is not just the cohesion of milieu and rhythm, since, if it were, rather than a constituting active force, territory would be a mere extension where things may or may not happen, and thus territory would not be an apt category by which differences among people and their distances are determined. Therefore, territory groups all the forces of the different milieus together in a single clump constituted by the forces of the Earth. But these are not grasped directly as forces, rather they are structured as existing relationships between matter and form: what is gathered is the already constituted rhythmic existence that is an individual and its attached milieu. This is because Chaos is an infinite speed of birth and disappearance, and so it cannot be simply held onto. Something must be conformed to contain these disruptive forces. In other words, Chaos must be forced to sustain an intense rhythm before even attempting to structure it through representation and signification. Thus, following Kleinherenbrink, all territories conform per the assemblage of milieus. A milieu is a semi-stable selection of chaos, a synthesis of unification, a development that constantly unfolds and persists, since individuals sustain a constant distance from things that introduces a degree of sameness “by drawing together heterogeneous components” (2015: 212). Territorialized, we are at our domain, its consolidation derives directly from how we work chaos, how we modulate those forces emerging from the depths. Indeed, chaos is nothing but a plane of composition, a non-place traversed by unstable, unformed matters, by flows, free intensities, by mad and transitory particles. Chaos is the free relation of forces that can dissolve the individual’s surroundings, as well as link them to new milieus.

In other words, what composes the territory is nothing but forces, affects, and affections; its fabric are the multiple vociferations, sonorities, temperatures, roughnesses, and diverse textures that compose the Earth. Every territory is an equilibrium, a dramatic tension of forces and velocities; indeed, the slightest mistake leads it to a complete collapse. What is the act of the territory? It is the first step after defounding, the moment of full creation. A detuned melody, an unusual aroma, and this entire creation is unfounded, with the forces of chaos re-established. If we consider chaos as the totality of smooth space where territories may arise, then a territory is the coding of chaotic forces through striation, structuring, and semiotic coding. In sum, all individuals are elemental to the conformation of a territory as they are integral parts of the societal structure. Nevertheless, all milieus are susceptible to chaotic disintegration and total dissolution: the in-between membranes and limits of all territories are constantly harassed by forces that emerge from the chaos. To sustain themselves, milieus establish rhythms to coerce chaos into being territorialized. Thus, a territory is first and foremost a semiotic domain. The way in which it captures the milieus and rhythms of individuals through the consolidation of a stratum, that is a whole system of codification that relates signs to

things through representation.

### **Experiencing the outside through the landscape**

In his lesson of the 7 of May of 1985 at Vincennes, during his seminar on cinema and thought, Deleuze points out that there exists a very curious type of desertic space that directly responds to the speech act that enunciates what lies outside the territory, a form of any-space-whatever [*espace quelconque*] that has its own image. The telluric image, as he calls it, is the manifestation of empty, disconnected spaces, or stratigraphic places where things flee upon the land, it is the expression of the somehow concealed intensive relationships that populate the Earth. In other words, the telluric image is the expression of a sort of intense deposit, a deterritorialized, buried amalgam of chaotic forces that remain tucked beneath the telluric sediments of our territory:

The visual image [...] again presents us what we have heeded to long ago under the name of any-space-whatever, that is, the empty or disconnected, disoriented spaces. There too the vertical is already in play; the primary character of the vertical is already in play, that is to say, the spaces whose different parts are not oriented in relation to one another. But we went a little bit further, and said: what are these spaces now? We couldn't carry on at that time. We contented ourselves by saying that they were empty, disoriented or disconnected spaces. But now we can say something more, that we must look at these spaces, it is very curious, these spaces which we can call 'telluric' or 'stratigraphic', or, ultimately, 'archaeological'. (Lesson of the 7<sup>th</sup> of May of 1985)

So, the telluric image consigns a space of geological, stratified layers that conceal something unshown (a buried element that is not revealed but made felt) by articulating the visual and sound cinematic framings in such a way that their relation is never one of absence but of irrational correspondence, a non-commensurable connection. In this sense, the telluric image is composed by some form of sonic enunciation or uttering and a visual stratification of what is being said. However, for such an image and expression to exist, both these elements must not coincide, what is uttered must not be at the time shown, and what is shown must not be what is uttered. This way, the speech act arises from within the layers of geographical stratification, expressing the telluric depth of our own historical moment. Thus, in the telluric image multiple voices, rhythms and refrains can be heard; sounds that do not correspond entirely to what is been seen, because they are deterritorializing speech acts that raise to the desertic surface a sort of aerial logic that counterbalances the logic by which the forces of the Earth conjoin and interact. In this sense, the telluric image is the expression of the Outside.

In this sense, the territorialized expanse, the land in itself, is the first degree of territory and the first instance of Earth's semiotization. It is where the first social assemblage of forces and signs happens. Now, this implies that the Earth is forever to be outside our spatial experience of the world; in fact, our body is the main earthly thing that forever remains accessible intrinsically to us, and yet somehow Earth remains aloof no matter how intricate our knowledge and sense of this incarnated constitution is. It seems then that Earth rests outside our spatial experience because we are primarily territorialized things; and that, if Earth is what is 'outside' territory, then to experience it we should first deterritorialize, which has as consequence the absolute loss of spatial coordinates, and overall bodily organization:

The earth is certainly not the same thing as the territory. The earth is the intense point at the deepest level of the territory or is projected outside it like a focal point, where all the forces draw together in close embrace. The earth is no longer one force among others, nor is it a substance endowed with form or a coded milieu, with bounds and an apportioned share. The earth has become that close embrace of all forces, those of the earth as well as of other substances. (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 338-339)

Brief, in the telluric image, the form of determination (*I think*) does not rest on an undetermined element (*I am*) but rather on the form of a pure determinable element (*space-time*). Time is what ends up separating the articulable and the visible, it is the force that generates their non-sequitur simultaneity. The problem here is the coadaptation of the two forms or two sorts of conditions: there is a fundamental difference between the form of content and the form of expression, between the visible and the utterable, which are intertwined in constant elusion. What is seen cannot be uttered, what is uttered cannot be seen, and thus the visual and the sonic continually overlap and spill into one another. This means that the two heterogeneous forms comprise a condition and a conditioned element, light and visibilities, language and statements, that inhabit a space of dissemination, a form of exteriority. The problem is, however, that we know that these elements somehow meet, that, somehow, they are forced to interact with one another, because this is what cinema synthesizes and expresses. And it is precisely this non-coincidence what allows for their integration. Hence, the telluric image maps this encounter, ensuring that every regime of knowledge remains traversed by the unthinkable forces that both sustain and exceed it.

It is at this point that finally the idea of landscape and territory come into place, because the power of these any-space-whatevers, of these telluric images, is that of the deserts. In the telluric image, we witness the growth of the desert, because when the sound-image and the visual-image become *héautonomous*: the sound-image refers to a new type of speech act (the act of fabulation), and the visual-image to a new type of

space, the telluric space that buries the event, that stratifies it. Therefore, when the speech act becomes [un]grounding, that is, fabulatory, what is revealed to us are the foundations of the Earth. Consequently, for every cinematic frame there is an outside, a space that lacks coordinates, that is de-centered and brimming with potentialities. This is the any-space-whatever, that is, a perfectly singular space “that has lost its homogeneity” (IM: 160), where the absence of connection is manifested, along with the wealth of potentialities or singularities that form the precondition for every actualization or determination.

Therefore, in these desertic spaces, the junction and orientation between the sayable and seeable is no longer predetermined, for it can be arranged in infinite ways. It is a space of extinction, of pining away that is not opposed to the genetic element. Therefore, the any-space-whatever is a space without distance, at ground level, a profound zero into which things sink and from which they shoot up to the surface when they are actualized. Hence, the fundamental problem this space must resolve is fragmentation, it is enforced with the task of restoring connections, of securing becoming. In effect, if the Earth is forever to be outside our spatial experience of the world because we are primarily territorialized things, if Earth is what is ‘outside’ territory, then to experience it we should first deterritorialize in favour of new vital connections.

Leaving the territory and interacting with the chaotic forces of the Earth removes the body from the stratum of the organism, human or animal, and connects it to other strata that remain outside all the prevalent territorial codes. Thence, landscape is the experience of the pure relationship of coexistence between worlds and territories, between environments; it is the act by which corporeal and territorial coordinates completely collapse. This is why, in *A thousand plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari note, “the deterritorialization of the body implies a reterritorialization on the face; the decoding of the body implies an overcoding by the face; the collapse of corporeal coordinates or milieus implies the constitution of a landscape” (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 181). In other words, landscape is the experience of the pure relationship of coexistence between worlds and territories, between environments. Therefore, landscape is rather a vivid and dynamic process than a thing, namely, landscapeification:

A concerted effort is made to do away with the body and corporeal coordinates through which the multidimensional or polyvocal semiotics operated. Bodies are disciplined, corporeality dismantled, becomings-animal hounded out, deterritorialization pushed to a new threshold—a jump is made from the organic strata to the strata of signification and subjectification. A single substance of expression is produced. [...] This machine is called the faciality machine because it is the social production efface, because it performs the facialization of the entire body and all its surroundings and objects, and the landscapeification of all worlds and milieus. The deterritorialization of the body implies a reterritorialization on the face; the decoding

of the body implies an overcoding by the face; the collapse of corporeal coordinates or milieus implies the constitution of a landscape. (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 181)

So, if chaos is the plane where all determinations arise and vanish, and if we have gone at this point from the forces of chaos to those of the Earth, then Earth is nowhere, it is a non-place of disordered forces infinitely acting upon one another. Thus, a territory is, like the cinematic frame, above all, a semiotic domain, and what remains 'outside' it is what remains absolutely deterritorialized, where forces openly interact with each other. In this sense, the Outside is the inexhaustible source of new relations and transformations, the non-place where forces affect and are affected by others; and it is in this sense that the outside is fundamentally open to the future, because nothing ever begins or ends, but everything is continually transformed. In addition, this openness entails a potentiality of resistance, insofar as every diagram of power already includes points of resistance that allow for change. While power operates within the limits of the diagram, resistance is linked directly to the outside that exceeds any given formation. Thus, resistance is the condition of transformation that makes power relations dynamic rather than closed, for by resisting we continually escape capture and open the territory to new possibilities. Therefore, the telluric image reveals a life that resists an Outside that continually disrupts and overturns diagrams of power. In short, to experience the Earth in a way means to dissolve our humanity in favour of new vital connections, since to experience the Earth we must become it by disrupting our territory. Only do we get a glimpse of Earth as a body and a-subjective, a-signifying existence when we become landscape with it:

Although in extension the territory separates the interior forces of the earth from the exterior forces of chaos, the same does not occur in 'intension', in the dimension of depth, where the two types of force clasp and are wed in a battle whose only criterion and stakes is the earth. There is always a place, a tree or grove, in the territory where all the forces come together in a hand-to-hand combat of energies. The earth is this close embrace. This intense center is simultaneously inside the territory, and outside several territories that converge on it at the end of an immense pilgrimage (hence the ambiguities of the 'natal'). Inside or out, the territory is linked to this intense center, which is like the unknown homeland, terrestrial source of all forces friendly and hostile, where everything is decided. (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 321)

Thus, leaving the territory and interacting with the chaotic forces of the Earth removes the body from the stratum of the organism, human or animal, and connects it to other strata that remain outside all the prevalent territorial codes. The individual no longer pertains to their territory, as they gain the complete vastness of the world. The body becomes an earthly force among others that can only interact with territories as shapes of a smooth world. This is the landscape, the act by which corporeal and territo-

rial coordinates completely collapse, and the shape and outline of one's own territory is brought forth. Space then is experienced as the pure relationship of coexistence between worlds and territories, between environments and associated milieux. All landscape experience, then, implies the constitution of a landscape. Therefore, landscape is rather a vivid and dynamic process, landscapification:

A concerted effort is made to do away with the body and corporeal coordinates through which the multidimensional or polyvocal semiotics operated. Bodies are disciplined, corporeality dis mantled, becomings-animal hounded out, deterritorialization pushed to a new threshold—a jump is made from the organic strata to the strata of signifiante and subjectification. A single substance of expression is produced. The white wall/black hole system is constructed, or rather the abstract machine is triggered that must allow and ensure the almightiness of the signifier as well as the autonomy of the subject. You will be pinned to the white wall and stuffed in the black hole. This machine is called the faciality machine because it is the social production efface, because it per forms the facialization of the entire body and all its surroundings and objects, and the landscapification of all worlds and milieux. The deterritorialization of the body implies a reterritorialization on the face; the decoding of the body implies an overcoding by the face; the collapse of corporeal coordinates or milieux implies the constitution of a landscape. (Deleuze & Guattari 2002: 181)

When the bond between self and place is broken, place becomes alien, and what is experienced is how our territoriality shapes the land, how it striates the Earth. While territory is the array of definite intervals that grid individual bodies according to imposed structures, landscape is what remains perpetually “outside” territory. Nevertheless, landscape is experienced territorially. Insofar as the Earth is the ground for all territories, landscape is where Earth is lived as the impervious reconfiguring agent presupposed by all territorial upsurges. Therefore, landscape can be thought as the aesthetic experience of what lies beyond the territories, the brutal realization that Earth's affective resonance is not constant but intermittently apprehensible, and that such intermittence is foundational to our experience of space as what is to come. Through the landscape we realize the superabundance of sense that the Earth harbours, that Earth is the complete susceptibility of symbols, the true expanse where human spaces may become.

Indeed, it is through landscape that the dissolved, time-afflicted subjectivity gains aesthetic access to Earth, which otherwise remains stratified and semiotically articulated. Landscape thus not only functions as the sensible opening toward what lies beyond territorial conceptualizations of space, governed as these are by intervals, distances, geosymbols, and emplacement; it is also only accessible per the dissolution of the self, which in turn means to become intrinsically related to the eventfulness of being. Because, to deterritorialize is to be dragged towards a space so disconnected, so inescapable, where

we find ourselves in a situation where the structuring of the world crumbles, an interstice presents itself as the Outside of every territory, of every ground, whose existence provokes the greatest insecurity. And so unbearable is this situation that it becomes necessary to act, necessary to survive this irrationality. How? By populating the desert, re-connecting multiplicities, establishing intense and affective connections between bodies. Ultimately, the telluric image is the urgent call for new peoples, new spatialities, new territories: something must happen. Because it shows us the desert at its most inhospitable, at its undeniably unbearable state. The new territory that comes to inhabit this interstice does indeed exist, but outside history, outside narration, outside strata; it exists insofar as it must be invented, fabulated.

## Conclusion

We usually experience the Earth as an immense, symbolic and structured place, where time is grounded by movement and spatial axis that traverses the expanse. The territorialized body is thus subject to relentless axial mutation, moving across a grid where time is quantified as the cost of spatial displacement. The journey is reduced to its metrics (how far is a point from another, how long does it take to go across certain areas) while the experiencing subject is assumed to remain identical to itself, barely unchanged. Only by sensing beyond the territorial can one apprehend the semiotic system that regulates spatial and temporal experience. From a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective, landscape appears not as a static formation but as a force of landscapification, the no-place in which dissolved subjectivities encounter the forces that generate new configurations of bodily and affective existence. Thus, since space is always indexed to a body-image, whenever bodies are occluded, crowded, or stratified in accordance with the social values they instantiate, no landscape can be entirely experienced. Indeed, all landscapes presuppose the detachment from territory and the acquisition of a placelessness and timelessness that goes beyond territorial temporo-spatial structures. New peoples emerge only through new spatial dispositions, through the actualization of new bodily configurations that exceed prior stratifications. Therefore, domination over bodies entails the control of landscape not as object, but as experience.

Landscape is indeed the experience of an Outside that is not exteriority, because de-territorialization rests on the rupture of the sensori-motor scheme, on the loss of connection with the world, on the loss of coordinates. What exteriority is there if the coordinates that lock our ground are lost? None. But there is, in any case, that inalterable existence that ground that is not the surface, but rather the depth upon which we mount our organism, where places emerge and bodies articulate per the institution of spatiality and social striations of the world. Landscape determines the shape of our territory just as it

defines the out-of-place, that structuring Outside of pure sense upon which we articulate our words and actions:

So, this outside, [50:00] it is not at all the external world, it is not at all the exteriority of the world. On the contrary, we have every reason to believe that this outside might be capable, perhaps, of giving us back a connection with the external world. But this outside can only emerge against the backdrop of a rupture with the external world. [Pause] This outside cannot emerge, it cannot seize us—since it is a matter of being seized by the outside—it can only seize us insofar as we have lost our relationship with the external world. (Deleuze, *Course on Cinema*: November 20<sup>th</sup>, 1984)

Indeed, to deterritorialize is to be dragged toward a space so disconnected, so incapable, that it forever remains outside any territory, outside any stratification. It is none other than the unthought, the unthinkable and forever unbeknownst force that will forever remain out-of-bounds of our spatial experience. Time, the constant and invisible force, the immanent and eternal caesura, resides in the deepest recess of thought and spatiality. The force of the Outside, that is Time. To see Time is to see life, to see the unshakable condition of all existence. It is to witness the innocence with which Being unfolds, with which it forms both a surface and a depth, where it treasures the virulent conjunction of its power. That is why the landscape is the fundamental condition of all action, because only in this way is it possible to generate the interval, the rupture of the sensori-motor scheme.

In effect, finding oneself in a situation where the structuring of the world crumbles implies a certain cut, a certain interstice that presents itself as the Outside of every territory, of every ground, whose existence provokes the greatest insecurity; such that the actual and the virtual are the same thing, all possible connections coalesce. And so unbearable is this situation that it becomes necessary to act, necessary to survive this irrationality. How? What to do? Populate the desert, reconnect multiplicities, establish intense and affective connections between bodies. Ultimately, Landscape is the call for new peoples, new spatialities, new territories. The desert is inhospitable; it is undeniable unbearable. The new territory that comes to inhabit this interstice does indeed exist, however outside of history, outside of narration, outside of strata; it exists insofar as it must be invented, insofar as it is both things at once.

When spatial values become rigid and otherwise non-interchangeable, there is no possibility of experiencing space and time outside given strict paradigms, which are imposed primarily by force. The upsurge of new peoples requires new spatial dispositions that correspond to the new incarnated experiences of space. Now, if the vast Earth, if our experience of Earth as such and ourselves as earthly beings is the experience of the landscape, then the domination on bodies is, partly, in the control of the landscape itself: how can you control and grid what is not an object? By controlling the experience of it, by

suppressing all forms of disjointed and dissolved subjectivities that may be voiced by peoples to come.

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